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THE CASH FLOW DILEMMA

Employers are generally required to withhold income, Social
Security, and Medicare taxes from their employees' paychecks.
Employers hold these taxes "in trust" until they are deposited or
otherwise paid over to the government.1 Since one of the most
common problems faced by owners and managers of businesses is the
lack of adequate cash to satisfy their numerous immediate obligations,
this system creates a temptation for the employer to use the withheld
funds to cover its costs. Short-term bank loans are often either
unavailable or unaffordable, and the employer's own debtors may be
unable to pay or not yet obligated to pay. 2 Certain creditors, such as
landlords, suppliers, shipping agents, and employees, must be paid on
time or the business would cease to operate. When confronted with
this dilemma, the employer may turn to the one source of cash
3
immediately available: the taxes withheld from employee paychecks.
This decision is usually seen as a short-term fix to a temporary
cash flow problem; the employer believes it will be able to meet its tax
obligations when due. If the employer manages to replenish its cash
before the withheld taxes are due, the employer satisfies its obligation
and avoids sanction. If the payment is late, the employer may be
liable for penalties. On the other hand, if cash flow problems are
permanent, the employer may be entirely unable to fulfill its
obligation to pay over the withheld taxes. If the company fails to pay

1.

I.R.C. § 7501(a) (2000).

2.

IRA L. SHAFIROFF, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE DESKBOOK 9-

3 to 9-4 (3d ed. 2004).
3.
See, e.g., Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238, 243 (1978) (noting that "[because the
Code requires the employer to collect taxes as wages are paid, while requiring payment of such
taxes only quarterly, the funds accumulated during the quarter can be a tempting source of
ready cash to a failing corporation beleaguered by creditors" (citation and footnote omitted)). The
taxes that are required to be withheld from employee wages are discussed infra Part II.B.1.
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the taxes when required, a full range of tax collection devices are
available to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
Withheld taxes are referred to as "trust fund taxes," in
reference to Internal Revenue Code (Code) section 7501, which states,
"the amount of tax so collected or withheld shall be held to be a special
fund in trust for the United States."4 Under general trust principles,
the employers' use of funds held in trust, as are "trust fund taxes,"
constitutes a misappropriation of those funds. 5 However, general
common law trust principles cannot be applied wholesale to this
context. 6 For example, despite the creation of a trust, there is no
requirement that the trust fund taxes be segregated from the
employer's general operating funds as soon as the trust taxes are
incurred. 7 While the IRS has the right to demand segregation, and
even criminalize the failure to do so, segregation does not help the
government collect trust fund taxes that have already been
misappropriated.8 Generally, the withholding system only requires
that the employer deposit the withheld taxes, pay the taxes with the
quarterly employment tax return, or both. 9
Collection is further complicated by the fact that, under the
withholding system, employees are entitled to a credit against their
personal tax liability for all taxes withheld from their paychecks,
regardless of whether the employer actually pays the government.1 0
The IRS has no recourse against employees for unpaid withheld taxes
but, rather, must seek payment from the employer. To this end, the
IRS has a number of statutory devices to effectuate collection.' 1 For
4.
I.R.C. § 7501(a); see also infra Part II.A.
5.
See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its
Economic Characterand Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1047 (1991) (discussing
how best to deter breaches of fiduciary duties). In this Note, therefore, the use of trust fund taxes
by the employer to pay the business creditors will be referred to as "misappropriation" or the
"misappropriation problem." See SHAFIROFF, supra note 2, at 9-5 to 9-6 (noting that in addition to
civil aspects, "the Internal Revenue Code also makes misappropriation of trust fund taxes a
felony").
See infra Part IV.A.
6.
7.
Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 61 (1990). The nature of the section 7501 trust compared to a
common law trust is discussed infra Part IVA,B.2-.3.
8.
I.R.C. §§ 7512, 7215; see infra note 35. Whether a universal segregation requirement is
practical, see infra note 199, is outside the scope of this Note. This Note deals with the devices
currently available to the IRS to collect misappropriated trust fund taxes.
The deposit, reporting, and payment requirements for withheld taxes are discussed
9.
infra Part II.B.
10. Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238, 243 (1978). The amount of a paycheck is the
employee's "net wages," which are the gross wages less deductions for employment taxes.
11. Section 7501 states that the funds held in special trust "shall be assessed, collected, and
paid in the same manner and subject to the same provisions and limitations (including penalties)
as are applicable with respect to the taxes from which such fund arose." I.R.C. § 7501(a). Thus,
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example, if the employer has other assets, the IRS may seize and sell
those assets to satisfy the trust fund tax obligation. 12 Criminal
13
sanctions are also available.
This Note focuses on two other collection devices. The first
device includes two mandatory penalty provisions assessed when the
employer pays the trust fund taxes late. 14 Section 6651(a) imposes a
monetary penalty on an employer who fails to timely pay the taxes
due with the quarterly employment tax return. 15 Section 6656(a)
imposes a monetary penalty on an employer who fails to timely
deposit the trust fund taxes into a government depository.' 6 Both
penalty provisions are "additions to tax," and their assessment is
mandatory unless the employer shows that the failure to pay 7 is "due
to reasonable cause and not willful neglect."' 8 The circuit courts are
currently split as to whether an employer's financial difficulties may
constitute reasonable cause, excusing the late payment of trust fund
taxes.' 9 This Note argues that, under trust and fiduciary principles,
misappropriation of trust fund taxes can never be excused as
reasonable, even if the misappropriation is absolutely necessary to
keep the business operating.
The second collection device applies if the employer does not
pay the trust fund taxes at all, and collection from it is not possible.
Section 6672 allows the IRS to hold certain employees personally
liable for the trust fund tax obligation. Under this "trust fund
recovery penalty," any "responsible person" who willfully fails to

there is available to the IRS the "full range of collection methods available for the collection of
taxes generally." Slodov, 436 U.S. at 244.
12. Slodov, 436 U.S. at 244.
13. For example, the Code imposes up to five years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine on any
responsible person who willfully fails to pay withheld taxes to the government. I.R.C. § 7202.
14. Penalty provisions are viewed as collection devices in that they are designed to ensure
voluntary compliance with the tax laws. According to the IRS Policy Statement P-1-18, the IRS
"'uses penalties to encourage voluntary compliance by' (1) helping taxpayers understand that
compliant conduct is appropriate and that noncompliant conduct is not; (2) deterring
noncompliance by imposing costs on it; and (3) establishing the fairness of the tax system by
justly penalizing the noncompliant taxpayer." IRS, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 4.10.6.1
(2004), http://www.irs.gov/irm/index.html.
15. I.R.C. § 6651(a)(2)-(3). Section 6651(a)(2) applies when the taxpayer fails to pay the
amount shown as due on a tax return. Section 6651(a)(3) applies to the amount of tax that
should have been shown as due on a tax return. For the purposes of this Note, this difference is
irrelevant.
16. Id. § 6656(a). For a discussion of the deposit requirements the Code imposes and the
penalty for failing to timely deposit, see infra notes 51-54, 61-63 and accompanying text.
17. This Note, for simplicity, refers to both the failure to pay over the taxes with the tax
return and the failure to pay the taxes to a depository bank as the "failure-to-pay" penalties.
18. I.R.C. §§ 6651(a)(2)-(3), 6656(a).
19. See infra Part III.B.
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collect, truthfully account for, or pay the trust fund taxes may be held
20
liable for the full amount of the employer's trust fund tax obligation.
This section is designed to ensure compliance "by subjecting the
employer's officials responsible for the employer's decisions regarding
21
withholding and payment" to personal liability for misappropriation.
The plain words of the section 6672 do not include a reasonable
cause exception excusing misappropriation because of financial
difficulties. The Tenth Circuit, however, has recently implied such an
exception in its reading of the willfulness requirement. 22 This Note
argues that this development is antithetical to the general trust
principle that misappropriation of trust funds is never excusable
because of the financial difficulties of the trustee. 23 Consequently, the
majority rule, that a reasonable cause exception for willfulness does
not exist, should be adhered to without modification.
This Note proceeds as follows. Part II introduces the federal
tax withholding system by explaining the types of taxes that must be
withheld, the special characteristics of trust fund taxes (as opposed to
direct taxes), and the penalty provisions applicable to them. Part III
examines the definition of willfulness under trust fund recovery
penalty, the majority rule rejecting a financial difficulties reasonable
cause exception, and the recent break from the prevailing view. This
section then compares recent divergent circuit court decisions on the
question of whether financial difficulties can constitute reasonable
cause for the failure-to-pay penalties, and examines how willfulness
jurisprudence has affected this determination. Part IV concludes that,
based upon trust and fiduciary duty of loyalty principles, no
reasonable cause exception (for any provision) should excuse the
misappropriation of trust fund taxes.
II. EMPLOYMENT TAXATION AND TRUST FUND TAXES
A. The Trust Fund Tax Concept
The Code often uses withholding, which requires a third party
to collect and hold a portion of a disbursement of property
20. See I.R.C. § 6672. Section 6672 is often referred to as the "100 percent penalty"; yet the
IRS calls it the "trust fund recovery penalty." See IRS, supra note 14, § 1.2.1.5.14. The wording of
the statute is nearly identical to the criminal statute, section 7202; however, courts have
interpreted the willfulness requirement differently. See I.R.C. § 7202; infra notes 74, 89.
21. Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238, 247 (1978).
22. See infra Part III.A.2 (discussing Finley v. United States, 123 F.3d. 1342 (10th Cir.
1997) (en banc).
23. See infra Part IV.B.3.

292

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:1

representing the recipient's tax obligations, as a common system of tax
collection. 24 The taxes collected are called "trust fund taxes" in
reference to section 7501(a) of the Code, which provides that the third
party holds the withheld taxes "in trust" for the government. 25
The contours of the trust fund tax concept were largely defined
by the Supreme Court in Beiger v. IRS.26 In that case, American
International Airways (AIA), a commercial airline, was subject to both
the employer withholding requirements and the airline ticket excise
tax collection requirement. 27 When AIA fell behind in its payment of
these trust fund taxes, the IRS required it to segregate the taxes by
depositing them into a separate bank account. 28 AIA established the
account but regularly failed to deposit funds sufficient to cover all of
the taxes owed. 29 AIA did, however, completely satisfy its trust fund
tax obligations by supplementing the special account with funds from
30
its general operating accounts.
AIA eventually went bankrupt, and a trustee was appointed to
liquidate the corporation. 3 1 The bankruptcy trustee, Beiger, sought to
exercise his "avoidance power" and recover the amount of trust fund
taxes paid by AIA during the ninety-day period prior to bankruptcy. 32
The Bankruptcy Court allowed Beiger to recover the trust fund taxes
paid out of the general accounts of ALA, reasoning that a section 7501
24. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1441(a) (requires any person who pays any item of income, such as
interest, rent, or dividends, to a nonresident alien or foreign partnership to deduct and withhold
30 percent of the amount paid as a tax); id. § 3402(q) (withholding of gambling winnings). Third
parties also have tax collection responsibility upon the receipt of certain payments, representing
federal excise taxes (taxes on the payor). For example, the tax on airline tickets is paid by the
customer, and is collected by the airlines. See id. § 4261 (imposes a 7.5 percent tax on the
amount paid for air transportation, which is collected by the airline when the ticket is paid for by
the passenger).
25. Id. § 7501(a); see Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 55-56 (1990). Because these taxes are
imposed on someone other than the party who is required to collect and pay the taxes, they are
often called "third-party taxes." See John W. Schmehl & Richard L. Fox, Responsible Person and
Lender Liability for Trust Fund Taxes-§§ 6672 and 3505, 639-2d Tax Mgt. (BNA) A-1 (2000).
Thus, the term "trust fund tax" only applies to third party taxes and not to direct tax obligations
(the person who is required to pay the taxes is the same person on which the tax is imposed).
26. 496 U.S. 53 (1990).
27. Id. at 55.
28. Id at 56. The Court is referring to I.R.C. § 7512. See discussion infra note 35.
29. Begier, 496 U.S. at 56. The case does not discuss it, but violations of section 7512 can
result in criminal penalties. See infra note 35.
30. Begier, 496 U.S. at 56.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 56-57. Under 11 U.S.C. § 574(b) (2001), a trustee may avoid certain preferential
payments the debtor made prior to bankruptcy if it "would 'enable a creditor to receive payment
of a greater percentage of his claim against the debtor than he would have received if the
transfer had not been made and he had participated in the distribution of the assets of the
bankrupt estate.' "Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 177 (1977)).
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statutory trust ("Code trust") is created only to the extent that the
trust fund taxes are segregated from the employer's general operating
funds. 33 The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the Code trust is
created at the time of collection (for excise taxes) or withholding (for
employment taxes), rather than upon segregation. 34 Adopting the
opposite rule would allow employers to avoid the creation of a trust by
simply refusing to segregate. 35 Thus, while trust fund taxes may
commingle with the company's general operating accounts, such
36
commingling does not change the nature of the trust.
Like all trusts, the taxes held in trust are the property of the
beneficiary, the government, and not of the trustee. 37 The withheld
taxes are never the property of the employer. 38 As a result, under
general trust principles, using withheld funds to satisfy business
expenses constitutes misappropriation of trust funds, which is a
breach of the trustee's fiduciary obligation. 39
Code trusts are,
33. See id. at 57 (citing In re Am. Int'l Airways, Inc., 83 B.R. 324, 329 (E.D. Pa. 1988)).
34. Id. at 60-61. For employment taxes, withholding occurs at the time net wages are paid
to the employees, and for airline ticket excise taxes, collection occurs when the customer pays for
the airline ticket. See id. The Code trust was created at these moments of payment, and the fact
that AIA did not place the taxes in a segregated account is irrelevant to the creation of the trust.
Id. at 61. Segregation is discussed more thoroughly infra note 199.
35. Begier, 496 U.S. at 61. Moreover, such a reading would make the special segregation
requirements of section 7512 superfluous. See id. Under this section, upon notice from the IRS, a
party required to collect or withhold trust fund taxes must segregate the taxes by placing them
in a separate bank account, where they must stay until paid to the government. I.R.C. § 7512(a)(b) (2000). If the party fails to meet these requirements, it is subject to criminal sanction. Id. §
7215(a). This section provides for up to one year imprisonment and up to a $5000 fine for each
offense. Id. The statute does not require a showing of intent to defraud or willfulness, but it does
provide an exception for persons who show that there was reasonable doubt as to (1) whether the
law required collection of the tax, or (2) who was required by law to collect the tax, and (3) the
failure to comply was due to circumstances beyond the payor's control. Id. § 7215(b); United
States v. Erne, 576 F.2d 212, 213 (9th Cir. 1978). Interestingly, however, the statute specifically
provides that "a lack of funds existing immediately after the payment of wages (whether or not
created by the payment of such wages) shall not be considered to be circumstances beyond the
control of a person." Id. § 7215(b). Thus, in one of the few Code sections that specifically refer to
trust fund taxes, financial hardship is rejected explicitly as an excuse for the failure to pay over
the trust fund taxes.
36. Furthermore, once the trust is established, the employee or customer who was directly
taxed receives credit for paying the tax regardless of whether the trustee actually pays the taxes
to the government. Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238, 243 (1978).
37. See, e.g, Gephart v. United States, 818 F.2d 469, 472 (6th Cir. 1987).
38. Income taxes are withheld from the employee's wages for the sole purpose of satisfying
the employee's tax liability, and if there is excessive withholding during the tax year, the
employee is entitled to a refund. See MERTEN'S LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 47A:48
(2004). Similarly, the Social Security and Medicare taxes withheld are part of the wages of the
employee, represent a direct tax on the employee, and at no time are the property of the
employer. Id.
39. GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 481 (2d
rev. ed. 1978). The Supreme Court has left open the question of whether section 7501 establishes
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however, fundamentally different from common law trusts. 40
Nevertheless, the Court clearly found that Congress intended to create
41
a "trust" in the taxes.
B. Withholding of Employment and Income Taxes from Employees
1. Employer Withholding Requirements and Liability
Taxpayers most noticeably encounter a withholding system
every time they receive a paycheck from their employer. Under the
Code, employers must withhold two types of taxes from the gross
wages 42 they pay to their employees: Federal Insurance Contributions
a basis of liability applicable to responsible persons independent of section 6672. Slodov, 436
U.S. at 256 n.18.
40. In Begier, the Supreme Court noted that, while common law trusts cannot exist without
an ascertainable property interest, Code trusts are created in an abstract "amount" rather than
in a particular interest in property. Begier, 496 U.S. at 62. For a detailed comparison of common
law trusts and Code trusts, see infra Part IV.A.
41. See Begier, 496 U.S. at 62 ("Our holding that a trust for the benefit of the IRS
existed ..
"); id. at 62 n.4 ("The general common-law rule that a trust is not created absent a
designation of particular property obviously does not invalidate § 750 l's creation of a trust in the
'amount' of withheld taxes."). This innovative "amount" trust also imposes very different
obligations on the employer-trustee as compared to the common law trustee. One serious
problem in the creation of the "amount trust" is seen in bankruptcy proceedings. Common law
tracing rules, which seek to trace the particular property, are unhelpful in the section 7501 trust
concept, which has no particular assets identified as held in trust. Id. at 62-63. Nevertheless, in a
bankruptcy proceeding, the IRS cannot simply take any asset to satisfy the trust fund obligation;
it must show some connection between the section 7501 trust and the debtor's assets or be
regulated to its ordinary claim in bankruptcy. Id. at 65-66; see also Slodov, 436 U.S. at 256
(holding that the rule requiring "a nexus between the funds collected and the trust created" is
consistent with common law principles requiring tracing of misappropriated funds). Thus, the
bankruptcy rules highlight the need for segregation. As in bankruptcy proceedings, the IRS could
trace the trust in the amount to the funds resting in the separate bank account or other
traceable fund. Larry A. Makel & James C. Chadwick, Lender Liability for a Borrower's Unpaid
Payroll Taxes, 43 BUS. LAW. 507, 527 (1988); see also Wayne Rodney, Note, The Non-Traceable
7501 Tax Trust and Bankruptcy Superiority, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 449, 450-51 (1992) (noting that
the IRS may have the option of tracing trust funds into other property of the debtor rather than
relying solely on its claim under Bankruptcy Code section 507(a)(7)(C) (2001)). If the IRS cannot
collect the full amount in bankruptcy, it will have no choice but to seek satisfaction from the
responsible persons under section 6672 of the Internal Revenue Code. See id. at 452 (discussing
the importance of section 6672 in a bankruptcy proceeding).
42. I.R.C. §§ 3101, 3111, 3121 (2000). Gross wages generally are defined as "all
remuneration for employment," though this rule is subject to numerous special exceptions and
much litigation. See id. § 3121. Section 3101 imposes the FICA tax on employees based on wages
received, and section 3111 imposes the tax on employers based on wages paid. Id. Wages are
received at the same time they actually or constructively are paid, and the rate of tax imposed on
the employer is equal to the rate of tax imposed on the employee. See id. §§ 3101, 3111; Treas.
Reg. § 31.3121(a)-.3122(a) (as amended in 1964). Thus, it is said that the employer "matches" the
amount withheld from the employee. Income tax withholding is computed differently than FICA
withholding. See infra note 45.
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Act (FICA) taxes, commonly referred to as Social Security 43 and
Medicare taxes, 44 as well as employee federal income taxes. 45 In
addition, there are two direct employment taxes imposed on the
employer: the employer's share of FICA, 46 and the federal
unemployment tax (FUTA). 47 These direct taxes are reported and
deposited similarly as the trust funds taxes, and the failure-to-pay
48
penalties will apply to both types of taxes.
For withheld taxes, the employer is liable to the government
for the amount that should have been withheld from the employee's
43. The Social Security tax funds federal retirement and disability benefits. Peter J.
Allman, Withholding, Social Security and Unemployment Taxes on Compensation 392-4th Tax
Mgt. (BNA) A-1 (2003). Referred to by the Code as old-age, survivors, and disability insurance
(OASDI), it taxes wages at a rate of 6.2 percent; thus, the total tax per dollar of compensation
paid is 12.4 percent. See I.R.C. §§ 3101(a), 3111(a). However, the Code imposes OASDI only up to
a statutory ceiling. See id. § 3121(a)(1); Cost-of-Living Increase and Other Determinations for
2003, 67 Fed. Reg. 65,620, 65,622 (Oct. 25, 2002). In 2003, wages in excess of $87,000 were not
subject to the tax. Id.
44. The Medicare tax funds federal health and medical benefits. Allman, supra note 43, at
A-1. Referred to by the Code as Hospital Insurance (HI), it has a tax rate of 1.45 percent, for a
total tax per dollar of wages of 2.90 percent. I.R.C. §§ 3101(b), 3111(b). Unlike OASDI, all wages
are taxed, regardless of amount. Allman, supra note 43, at A-10(1).
45. See I.R.C. § 3402(a). Income tax withholding, unlike FICA, is based on the amount gross
wages exceed withholding exemptions, which approximate the personal and dependency
exemptions the employee will claim, prorated to the payroll period. See id. § 3402(a)(2). This
system disperses payment of an individual's income tax liability throughout the year by taking a
certain percentage from each paycheck, instead of requiring an annual lump sum payment with
the tax return. See Graske v. Comm'r, 20 T.C. 418, 420 (1953). The amount of tax that must be
withheld can be computed under a variety of methods. The Code provides for the percentage
method, see I.R.C. § 3402(b); Treas. Reg. § 31.3402(b)-i (as amended in 1983); the wage bracket
method, see I.R.C. § 3402(c); Treas. Reg. § 31.3402(c)-i (as amended in 1983); the average wage
method, see I.R.C. § 3402(h)(1); Treas. Reg. § 31.3402(h)(i)-1 (1970); the annualized wage
method, see I.R.C. § 3402(h)(2); Treas. Reg. § 31.3402(h)(2)-1 (1970); the cumulative wage
method, see I.R.C. § 3402(h)(3); Treas. Reg. § 31.3402(h)(3)-1 (as amended in 1983); and any
other method that substantially approximates the percentage method or wage bracket method,
see I.R.C. § 3402(h)(4);Treas. Reg. § 31.3402(h)(4)-1 (as amended in 1983).
46. See supra note 42. Because this tax is imposed on the employer, it is a direct tax and not
a trust fund tax. I.R.C. § 7501. This tax is an excise tax "on the privilege of establishing and
maintaining the relationship of employer and employee." See Jones v. Goodson, 121 F.2d 176,
179 (10th Cir. 1941).
47. This tax, which funds federal unemployment benefits, is similar to the employer's
portion of FICA in that it is an excise tax with respect to the privilege of employing individuals.
I.R.C. § 3301. Currently, if applicable, the tax is 6.2 percent on the first $7000 of wages paid to
each employee in the year. §§ 3301, 3306(b)(1). Because FUTA is a tax only imposed on the
employer, there is no withholding of FUTA tax, which makes it a non-trust fund tax. See § 7501.
However, FUTA taxes are reported and deposited, so financial hardship will result in
nonpayment of the FUTA taxes and additions of sections 6651 and 6656 penalties. One must
clearly distinguish FUTA taxes from the trust fund taxes, however, in applying the reasonable
cause exceptions under those sections.
48. When determining reasonable cause, the courts must note this crucial distinction and
not apply trust fund misappropriation principles to direct taxes. Section 6672 only applies to
trust fund taxes under section 7501. See I.R.C. §§ 6672, 7501.
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gross wages; therefore, penalties attach if the wrong amount or no
amount is withheld. 49 The employer is entitled to a credit if the tax is
otherwise paid by the employee; however, this credit does not operate
to abate any penalties or interest owed by the employer due to the
50
failure to withhold.
2. Deposit and Reporting Requirements
After collecting the employment taxes, employers must
generally deposit them in a government-approved depository bank and
report the amount collected to the IRS. 51 This requires the employer
to deposit both the trust fund taxes and the employer's share of FICA
with an authorized financial institution within a specified time after
collection. 52 Small businesses are the only employers who are exempt
from the duty to deposit taxes. 53 Failure to timely deposit the correct
amount subjects the employer to the mandatory failure-to-deposit
penalty.54
In addition to the deposit requirements, an employer must file
a quarterly return with the IRS that reports the full amount of its
employment tax liability. 55 If the employer has deposited the full

49. Treas. Reg. § 31.3102-1(c) (as amended in 1964); Treas. Reg. § 31.3402(d)-i.
50. I.R.C. § 3402(d); Treas. Reg. § 31.3402(d)-i. These general rules of employer liability are
relaxed if the failure to withhold the taxes was due to the employer erroneously treating the
employee as an independent contractor. See I.R.C. § 3509. This oft-litigated distinction is
important because FICA and income tax withholding is only required with respect to
compensation paid to employees. See id. §§ 3101, 3401, 3402. Generally, the common law rules of
employment make this determination, although the Code defines some relationships. See, e.g.,
id. §§ 3121(b)(20), 3401(a)(17) (exempting from FICA and income tax withholding, respectively,
services performed by individuals on a boat engaged in catching fish or other aquatic life under
certain conditions); Marvel v. United States, 719 F.2d 1507, 1514 (10th Cir. 1983) (finding that
employment under the Code is determined by reference to common law rules). Because this
distinction is not always clear, section 3509 provides that if the employer fails to withhold due to
a misclassification, its liability with respect to the employee's FICA taxes is limited to a
percentage of the taxes that should have been withheld. See I.R.C. § 3509(a).
51. Treas. Reg. § 31.6302-1 (as amended in 2001).
52. Id. Employers are classified as either "monthly" or "semi-weekly" depositors. Id.
Employers that have more than $50,000 in employment taxes during the "lookback" period-the
year ending June 30th of the preceding year-are semiweekly depositors and must deposit the
taxes generally within a few days after payroll is paid. See id. § 31.6302-1(b)(3). Monthly
depositors must deposit the accumulated taxes on the 15th day of the following month. Id. §
31.6302-1(b)(2). FUTA taxes are also must be separately deposited every quarter whenever the
tax in that quarter exceeds $100. Id. § 31.6302(c)-3.
53. Id. § 31.6302-1(0(4) (allowing employers with less than $2500 in accumulated
employment taxes to remit payment with a timely filed return).
54. I.R.C. § 6656(a).
55. It is the Form 941 return. See Treas. Reg. § 31.6011(a)-i (as amended in 1976) (applying
to FICA); Treas. Reg. § 31.6011(a)-4 (as amended in 1996) (applying to withheld income taxes).
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amount of the employment taxes owed, no additional tax is due with
the return. If, however, deposits were insufficient to satisfy tax
obligations, taxes must be remitted with the return or the employer
will be subject to the failure-to-pay penalty. 56 An alternative to the
monetary penalty provision is the trust fund recovery penalty, which
57
may be assessed against certain employees of the employer.
C. PenaltiesApplicable to Failures To Meet Reporting and Depositing
ObligationsBecause of FinancialHardship
1. Failure To Pay and Failure To Deposit
The failure-to-pay penalty, assessed when the employer fails to
pay taxes due with its quarterly return, is the basic penalty provision
that applies to all tax returns. It provides for up to a 25 percent
penalty on the amount shown as tax, or that should have been shown
as tax, on the return. 5 Assessment of this penalty can be excused
only if the taxpayer can show that the failure to pay is "due to
reasonable cause and not willful neglect." 59 Because any penalty
assessment imposed by the IRS enjoys a presumption of correctness,
60
the taxpayer has the burden of proving reasonable cause.
Likewise, the failure-to-deposit penalty can be excused only if
the taxpayer can show that the failure was due to reasonable cause
and not willful neglect. 61 The penalty can be up to 15 percent of the
underpayment 62 depending upon the number of days that the deposit
Additionally, employers must file Form 940, the FUTA tax return, in January and pay any
amounts due with that return. Treas. Reg. § 31.6011(a)-3(a) (as amended in 1972).
56. See Treas. Reg. § 31.6302-1(i)(2).
57. See infra Part II.C.2.
58. I.R.C. § 6651(a)(2)-(3). Section 6651 also includes a failure to file penalty of up to 25
percent. § 6651(a)(1). The amount assessed is determined under the following formula: 0.5
percent of the amount shown on the return will be assessed if the failure to pay is for less than
one month, with an additional 0.5 percent for each additional month or fraction thereof, for a
total penalty not to exceed 25 percent, or 60 months. § 6651(a). For the purposes of this Note, any
differences in the rate structures between the failure-to-pay tax shown on a return and failureto-pay tax that should have been shown on a return is irrelevant.
59. Id. § 6651(a)(2)-(3); Ferrando v. United States, 245 F.2d 582, 587 (9th Cir. 1957).
60. See, e.g., In re Callery, 274 B.R. 51, 60-61 (D. Mass. 2002); Dogwood Forest Rest Home,
Inc. v. United States, 181 F. Supp. 2d 554, 560 (M.D.N.C. 2001). The Taxpayer Bill of Rights 3
places the burden of production for the penalty assessment on the IRS; this requires it to come
forward with evidence justifying the imposition of the penalty. However, the taxpayer retains
the burden of production and proof as to reasonable cause. Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3001, 112 Stat.
726 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 7491); see SHAFIROFF, supra note 2, at 13-4, 13-40.
61. I.R.C. § 6656(a).
62. The underpayment is the difference between the amount deposited and the amount that
should have been deposited.
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is late. 63 The definition of "reasonable cause" is construed identically
for both sections, and courts do not differentiate between the two
when discussing the exception. 64 It is also important that neither
penalty is exclusive and each may be assessed on the same underlying
65
obligation.
2. Trust Fund Recovery Penalty and Responsibility
The failure-to-pay penalties create an incentive for employers
to pay on time. However, when the employer is insolvent and entirely
unable to pay, the penalties are rendered ineffective in ensuring
timely payment. The IRS can then utilize the "trust fund recovery
penalty" as an alternative means to collect the taxes. 66 This penalty
imposes personal liability for the full amount of unpaid taxes 67 on any
person required to withhold or pay trust fund taxes who willfully fails
to do S0.68 Importantly, the responsible person is liable only for the

63. Id. § 6656(b). The amount of the penalty is determined as follows: 2 percent if the
failure is for not more than five days, 5 percent if the failure is for more than five days but not
more than fifteen days, and 10 percent if the failure is for more than fifteen days. Id. §
6656(b)(1). After a delinquency notice or demand for immediate payment, however, the penalty
increases to 15 percent. Id.
64. Dogwood Forest, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 560 n.4. Outside of reasonable cause, section 6656
allows the IRS to waive the penalty for first-time depositors under limited circumstances. See
I.R.C. § 6656(c)-(d). There is no comparable exception in section 6651. Compare id. § 6656 with
id. § 6651.
65. See, e.g., Brewery, Inc. v. United States, 33 F.3d 589, 591 (6th Cir. 1994) (finding the
action for refund based on assessment of both the failure to timely pay and failure to timely
deposit penalties to employee withholding and social security taxes). In fact, financial difficulties
often lead to the assessment of penalties. If an employer uses the withheld taxes as business
expenses and cannot meet deposit obligations, it is subject to the failure-to-deposit penalty. In
addition, because the employer must remit any taxes it failed to deposit with its quarterly
return, if its financial difficulties continue, it will also be subject to the failure-to-pay penalty. It
is easy to see how quickly the penalty liability can amass to very burdensome amounts.
66. See IRS, supra note 14, § 1.2.1.5.14. The purpose of this penalty, according to the IRS,
"is to encourage the prompt payment of withheld and other collected taxes, and to provide the
Service with a secondary source of collection in the event that these taxes are not paid." Id. §
4.23.9.13(a)(2). Personal liability "serves a valuable prophylactic purpose: it encourages officers,
directors, and other high-level employees to stay abreast of the company's withholding and
payment of employee's taxes." Sutton v. United States, 194 F. Supp. 2d 559, 563 (E.D. Tex. 2001)
(quoting Barnett v. IRS, 988 F.2d 1449, 1457 (5th Cir. 1993)).
67. A responsible person's liability is reduced to the extent that the employer pays over a
portion trust fund taxes. See Schmehl & Fox, supra note 25, at A-2.
68. See I.R.C. § 6672(a). Because the "responsible person" is liable for the full amount of the
unpaid taxes, this penalty is commonly called the "100 percent penalty." See, e.g., SHAFIROFF,
supra note 2, at 9-3. When more than one responsible person exists, the liability is joint and
several, though there is now a statutory right to contribution. Stuart Levine, The Right to
Contributionfrom Other Responsible Persons-How Far Does It Go?, 86 J. TAX'N 76, 76 (1997).
The lack of such a right was often cited as one of the unfair aspects of responsible person
liability. Mary A. Bedikan, The Pernicious Reach of 26 U.S.C. Section 6672, 13 VA. TAX. REV.
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amount of the underlying tax obligation, not any additional penalty
amounts that may have been added, such as the failure-to-pay
69
penalties.
To escape liability, a person must negate one of the two
elements of trust fund recovery penalty liability: responsibility or
willfulness. 70 According to the Supreme Court, the responsibility
element holds liable only "the employer's officials responsible for the
'7 1
employer's decisions regarding withholding and payment.
Nevertheless, federal courts have routinely extended liability beyond
the actual decision makers. 72 The willfulness element requires that

225, 248-50 (1993). In addition, the Code contains an exception to section 6672 for voluntary
board members of tax exempt organizations. I.R.C. § 6672(e). Under this section, these board
members are not liable for the trust fund recovery penalty if (1) they are "serving in a honorary
capacity," (2) they do not "participate in the day-to-day or financial operations of the
organization," and (3) they do not have actual knowledge of the failure to pay over the trust fund
taxes.Id.
69. 4 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, TAx PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
114.7, at
114-62 (2d ed. 2003). Thus, the trust fund recovery penalty acts as a collection device, ensuring
the government receives what it originally was owed. Id. As such, the IRS may only once collect
the amount of taxes owed. E.g., United States v. Huckabee Auto Co., 783 F.2d 1546, 1548 (11th
Cir. 1986) (citing United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268, 279 n.12 (1978)). In addition, while the
trust fund recovery penalty is normally utilized only when the employer is insolvent, the liability
it imposes on responsible persons is separate and distinct from the employer's liability, and as a
result, the IRS is not required to first exhaust its remedies against the employer. See id. at 1548;
Parr v. United States, 203 F. Supp. 2d 726, 733 (S.D. Tex. 2002). The IRS, however, has stated
that its policy is to collect from the responsible person only if the taxes cannot be collected from
the corporation itself, though it is not under a legal obligation to do so. SHAFIROFF, supra note 2,
at 9-22 & n.34.
70. See Schmehl & Fox, supra note 25, at A-1 (stating the two requirements for liability
under section 6672). Like the failure-to-pay and failure-to-deposit penalties, the general rule is
that once the recovery penalty has been assessed, the responsible person has the burden of
disproving liability. See, e.g., United State v. Running, 7 F.3d 1293, 1297 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding
the taxpayer has both the burden of production and persuasion after assessment); Schmehl &
Fox, supra note 25, at A-44 to A-45 (discussing the presumption of correctness). This rule is
different, however, in bankruptcy. See In re Macagnone, 253 B.R. 99, 101 (M.D. Fla. 2000)
(holding that the government has the burden of proving responsibility, but the burden shifts to
the taxpayer to disprove willfulness); SHAFIROFF, supra note 2, at 9-31 n.50 (noting that the
burden of proof is on the taxpayer to demonstrate that he or she did not willfully fail to perform
her duties). The IRS, moreover, may have the burden of proving liability in "naked assessments"
(such as when the taxpayer's file is lost). See id. In the Taxpayers Bill of Rights 3, the burden of
production was shifted to the IRS with respect to any penalty or addition to tax imposed by the
Code. Id. at 9-24. If the trust fund recovery penalty is viewed as a true penalty, then the burden
is on the IRS, but if it is viewed as an employment tax, the burden is on the taxpayer. Id.
71. Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238, 247 (1978). The Code defines a section 6672
"person" as "an officer or employee of a corporation, or a member or employee of a partnership,
who as such officer, employee, or member is under a duty" to collect and pay over the taxes in
question. I.R.C. § 6671(b).
72. See, e.g., Hochstein v. United States, 900 F.2d 543, 545, 547-48 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding
defendant, who signed the checks, liable even though a financing company told him who to pay);
Corrie L. Lyle, Note, The Wrath of I.R.C. § 6672. The Renewed Call for Change-Is Anyone
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liability not be imposed without personal fault. 73 Despite a potentially
large monetary sanction, courts classify the penalty as civil because no
prison time is involved, and are therefore more comfortable construing
74
the requirements broadly.
Generally, responsibility is determined based upon the person's
"status, duty, and authority,"75 given the totality of the
circumstances. 76 While precise principles are difficult to extrapolate
from these fact-intensive cases, courts tend to focus on the person's
duty and authority with regard to the financial affairs of the
business. 77 Generally, a responsible person must have the actual
78
power to pay the taxes, exerting significant, though not exclusive,
control over the company finances. 79 While no single factor is
Listening?, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1133, 1146-47 (2001) (discussing the unjust result in Hochstein as
just one example of overreaching in defining responsible persons).
73. Slodov, 436 U.S. at 254; see discussion infra Part III.A.
74. See Logal v. United States, 195 F.3d 229, 232 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting the responsibility
element is to be construed broadly); Lyle, supra note 72, at 1145. To illustrate this point,
compare Internal Revenue Code section 6672 with section 7202. Section 7202 is a criminal felony
provision that uses the exact language as section 6672, requiring responsibility and willfulness,
and imposes a penalty of up to five years in prison and/or a $10,000 fine. I.R.C. §§ 6672, 7202.
Since the sanctions are criminal, courts have more narrowly construed the definition of
willfulness under section 7202 even though the 100 percent penalty of section 6672 may impose a
much greater monetary penalty than a $10,000 fine. See infra note 89.
75. See, e.g., Mazo v. United States, 591 F.2d 1151, 1156 (5th Cir. 1979). Status, by itself, is
not important because courts generally have stated that mere technical authority or titular
designation alone is not an indication of responsibility, though it is a factor. Fiataruolo v. United
States, 8 F.3d 930, 939 (3d Cir. 1993). Likewise, while share ownership is a factor in determining
responsibility, generally for close corporations, share ownership alone is not dispositive. Vinick v.
United States, 205 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2000). Duty generally involves the degree of control over
and involvement in the business, such as whether the person has an active management role in
daily operations or the ability to hire and fire employees. See, e.g., id. at 8-9; Mahler v. United
States, 121 F. Supp. 2d 179, 184 (D. Conn. 2000).
76. The Third Circuit's test is representative: In determining responsibility, courts consider
the following (nondispositive) factors: "(1) contents of the corporate bylaws, (2) ability to sign
checks on the company's bank account, (3) signature on the employer's federal quarterly and
other tax returns, (4) payment of other creditors in lieu of the United States, (5) identity of
officers, directors, and principal shareholders of the firm, (6) identity of individuals in charge of
hiring and discharging employees, and (7) identity of individuals in charge of the firm's financial
affairs." Brounstein v. United States, 979 F.2d 952, 954-55 (3d Cir. 1992).
77. Gephart v. United States, 818 F.2d 469, 473 (6th Cir. 1987) (stating that it is well
established that the test for responsibility focuses "upon the degree of influence and control
which the person exercised over the financial affairs of the corporation and, specifically,
disbursements of funds and the priority of payments to creditors").
78. Courts have rejected the "final word" or "ultimate control" test, which finds
responsibility only if the person has the final word or ultimate control over which bills are paid,
including taxes. Bedikan, supra note 68, at 238 (citing Adams v. United States, 504 F.2d 73 (7th
Cir. 1974)).
79. Brounstein, 979 F.2d at 954; Morgan v. United States, 937 F.2d 281, 284 (5th Cir. 1991).
Factors suggesting significant control include (1) decision-making authority concerning which,
when, and in what order creditors are paid, (2) control over the company's bank accounts, (3)
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dispositive, authority over disbursements, including the determination
of which creditors get paid, and the authority to write checks appear
to be highly significant, at least when they both exist at the same
80
time.
The broad application of this significant control test 8 l is often
criticized by commentators, who complain that the courts have greatly
expanded liability beyond the officials who are actually responsible for
the nonpayment of the trust fund taxes.8 2 Courts, for example, have
found employees responsible even though they were under explicit
orders from their superiors not to pay taxes, 8 3 or had little more than
84
technical check-writing authority.
Recognizing the often inequitable imposition of responsibility,
the IRS changed its policy in the early 1990s in an attempt to focus
collection only on those persons truly responsible for the employer's
signatures on the company's federal quarterly and other tax returns, and (4) the ability to sign
checks. See Vinick, 205 F.3d at 9-10; Brounstein, 979 F.2d at 954-55; Mahler, 121 F. Supp. 2d at
184.
80. SHAFIROFF, supra note 2, at 9-8 to 9-9 & n.14.3, 9-11 n.14.13 (arguing that check
writing authority is the crucial factor in the cases); James C. Seiffert & W. Bryan Hudson, IRS's
New Approach to Determining "Responsible"Personsfor the 100 Percent Penalty, 79 J. TAX'N 144,
145 (1993) (stating that the definition of responsibility "presumably lead the courts to the
individuals who have the 'final word' as to the payment of taxes"); see Vinick, 205 F.3d at 10
(noting that technical check-writing ability without the ability to determine who is paid is a
weak pillar on which to base liability).
81. See Gustin v. United States, 876 F.2d 485, 491 (5th Cir. 1989) (noting that the Fifth
Circuit takes a broad view of who qualifies as a responsible person).
82. See, e.g., Bedikan, supranote 68, at 238-39.
83. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 779 F.2d 1567, 1572 (11th Cir. 1986); Howard v. United
States, 711 F.2d 729, 734-35 (5th Cir. 1983). In Howard, the Fifth Circuit, while "appreciating
the difficulty" of his position, nevertheless held that Howard was responsible even though he
might have been fired for paying the taxes. See Howard, 711 F.2d at 735 ("Howard had a choice.
He could have paid the taxes, accepted the consequences, and thus avoided the penalty."). This
rule also has been extended to willfulness, where most courts find that following a superior's
orders does not negate willfulness. See, e.g., Gephart v. United States, 818 F.2d 469, 475 (6th
Cir. 1987). This defense often is called the "Nuremberg defense." Jay v. United States, 865 F.2d
1175, 1177 n.3 (10th Cir. 1989).
84. For example, in Hochstein v. United States, an officer of a corporation was held to be a
responsible person even though control over the company was in the hands of a financing
company. 900 F.2d 543, 548 (2d Cir. 1990). The officer, Hochstein, repeatedly requested funds to
pay the trust fund taxes, but the financing company gave him only enough to pay net wages. Id.
at 546. The court, analogizing the financing company to the superior in Howard, found that
Hochstein's check-writing authority and position in the corporation made him a responsible
person, notwithstanding the fact that the financing company could have been held fully liable for
the taxes, since they were in control. See id. at 546-47; Lyle, supra note 72, at 1146 (discussing
Hochstein and noting that he merely signed checks for the financing company that controlled the
corporation); Howard L. Sosnick, Even Third Parties Can Be Hit with Payroll Tax Responsibility,
23 TAX'N FOR LAW. 218, 219-20 (discussing Alsheskie v. United States, 31 F.3d 837 (9th Cir.
1994)). In Alsheskie, the Ninth Circuit distinguished Hochstein, stating that there was no
evidence that Hochstein did not have authority to pay taxes, while Alsheskie was limited by the
financing agreement. Alsheskie, 31 F.3d at 839.
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decisions regarding payment of the trust fund taxes.8 5 It exempted
those employees that performed purely "ministerial" acts, which
apparently exempts only lower level employees.8 6 It remains to be seen
whether this shift will solve the recognized problems of the past,
considering that the policy appears quite limited and that the courts
will likely continue to apply a broad definition of responsibility.

III. WILLFULNESS AND REASONABLE CAUSE
Even where a person is deemed responsible, personal liability
is not imposed unless that person willfully failed to pay the trust fund
taxes to the government. Generally, in the course of interpreting the
willfulness element, a recklessness standard has evolved.8 7 This Part
examines the willfulness element under the trust fund recovery
penalty, and the effects of willfulness jurisprudence on the reasonable
cause exceptions of the failure-to-pay penalties with regards to the
misappropriation problem.
A. The Definition of Willfulness Under the Trust Fund Recovery
Penalty
1. General Principles
Willfulness is established where a responsible person (1) makes
a voluntary, conscious, and intentional, decision to use the withheld
funds to pay other creditors in preference to the government, usually
called a deliberate choice or (2) recklessly disregards a known or
obvious risk that the taxes may not be remitted to the government.88
Importantly, the civil definition of willfulness is not dependent upon a
showing of a bad motive or an intent to defraud or deprive the
government of the taxes.8 9
Willfulness does, however, require
personal fault beyond negligence. 90
85. Seiffert & Hudson, supra note 80, at 144.
86. See IRS, supra note 14, § 5.7.3.3.1.2(3). In its view, the " 'full scope of authority and
responsibility would be contingent upon whether the person had the ability to exercise
independent judgment with respect to the business's financial affairs.'" SHAFIROFF, supra note 2,
at 9-9 (quoting IRS, supra note 14, § 5.7.3.3.5). Thus, non-owner employees, who act solely under
the dominion and control of others, should not be subject to the penalty. See IRS, supra note 14, §
1.2.1.5.14(4).
87. See Morgan v. United States, 937 F.2d 281, 286 (5th Cir. 1991) (noting that "[miere
negligence does not establish willfulness"); infra Part III.A.
88. See, e.g., Cook v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 62, 69 (2002).
89. Id.; see supra note 74. Compare Monday v. United States, 421 F.2d 1210, 1216 (7th Cir.
1970) (holding section 6672 "[1]iability does not depend upon the presence of bad motive or the
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The courts have considered two factual paradigms to constitute
a deliberate choice to misappropriate withheld funds as a matter of
law. The first paradigm is where the responsible person elects to pay
business creditors with funds that he knows are needed to pay the
trust fund taxes. 91 This includes the payment of net wages to
employees with knowledge that there are insufficient funds to pay
employment taxes. 92 The second is where the responsible person has
knowledge of the withholding tax delinquency, yet permits the
payment of other creditors before the government. 93 If a responsible
person becomes aware of a trust fund tax delinquency after the fact,
he has an affirmative duty to use all existing94 and after-acquired
unencumbered funds to satisfy the tax obligation.
specific intent to defraud the Government or deprive it of revenue"), with Cheek v. United States,
498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991) (defining willfulness in the context of criminal tax statutes as "a
voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty") and United States v. Morrison, No. 014336, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 1948, at *5-6 (4th Cir. Feb. 7, 2002) (noting Cheek's definition of
willful incorporates the bad purpose or evil motive requirement of Bishop v. United States, 412
U.S. 346, 361 (1973)).
90. See Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238, 254 (1978); Cook, 52 Fed. Cl. at 69.
91. See, e.g., Collins v. United States, 848 F.2d 740, 742 (6th Cir. 1987); Godfrey v. United
States, 748 F.2d 1568, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Howard v. United States, 711 F.2d 729, 736 (5th
Cir. 1983); Parr v. United States, 203 F. Supp. 2d 726, 735 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
92. Cook, 52 Fed. Cl. at 69-70 (citing Sorenson v. United States, 521 F.2d 325, 328 (9th Cir.
1975)). The preference of any claim, including wage claims, over the government's claim to the
withheld funds is willful, and if there are insufficient funds, the employer must prorate the
available funds between the government and the employees, even if the employees threaten to
quit. Sorenson, 521 F.2d at 328; see Hochstein v. United States, 900 F.2d 543, 548 (2d Cir. 1990)
("For purposes of determining willfulness, an employee to whom the corporate employer owes
wages is simply another creditor.").
93. See, e.g., Gephart v. United States, 818 F.2d 469, 475 (6th Cir. 1987) ("Plaintiff
admitted that he was aware of the unpaid federal withholding tax liability ... and that,
notwithstanding such knowledge, he continued 'to sign checks in payment of other corporate
obligations. This action constitutes willfulness .. ");Frey v. United States, No. 3:99-CV-0831-D,
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5786, at *21 (N.D. Tex. May 4, 2001) ("Once Frey became aware of the tax
liability, [she] had a duty to ensure that the taxes were paid before any payments were made to
other creditors." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
94. E.g., Davis v. United States, 961 F.2d 867, 876 (9th Cir. 1992). "Unencumbered funds"
are defined as funds "[w]here the taxpayer's discretion in the use of funds is subject to
restrictions imposed by a creditor holding a security interest in the funds which is superior to
any interest claimed by the IRS, [and] the funds are regarded as encumbered if those restrictions
preclude the taxpayer from using the funds to pay the trust fund taxes." Honey v. United States,
963 F.2d 1083, 1090 (8th Cir. 1992). The Davis/Honey rule is modified if (1) the responsible
person acquires a company with a prior trust fund tax delinquency, or (2) the person was not a
responsible person when the delinquency accrued, but later became responsible. In the first case,
if the person assumes control of the company when there are no funds with which to satisfy the
tax obligation, and the after-acquired funds are not directly traceable to the withheld funds, the
use of after-acquired funds to pay other creditors is not willful. Slodov, 436 U.S. at 259-60; see
Mazo v. United States, 591 F.2d 1151, 1154 (5th Cir. 1979) (limiting Slodov to instances where
there was a change in control of the company). In the second case, the liability of the responsible
person is generally limited to the amount of the unencumbered funds available at the time that
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The adoption of the recklessness standard greatly expanded
the scope of the willfulness requirement because it encompasses
instances
where
there
is
no actual knowledge
of the
misappropriation. 95 The courts continue to stress, however, that
ordinary negligence does not constitute willfulness, 96 though they
often equate willfulness with gross negligence. 97 Therefore, absent
circumstances that create an obvious risk that the trust fund taxes are
not being paid, the responsible person's lack of knowledge as to his or
her nonpayment constitutes simple negligence and absolves the
98
responsible person from liability.
Courts consider the following factual paradigms to be
recklessness as a matter of law: where the responsible person (1)
relies upon assurances from a person, whom the responsible person
knows to be unreliable, that the taxes have been paid; 99 (2) fails to
investigate or correct mismanagement after the responsible person
has notice of nonpayment; 10 0 and (3) knows that the business is in

person became responsible, and does not extend to after-acquired funds. Michaud v. United
States, 40 Fed. Cl. 1, 26-27 (1997). For a comparison of the after-acquired funds doctrine and the
existing funds doctrine, see id. at 24-28.
95. See, e.g., Vinick v. Comm'r, 110 F.3d 168, 173 (1st Cir. 1997) ("[A]n individual who acts
with a 'reckless disregard' of a known or obvious risk of nonpayment acts willfully."); Cook, 52
Fed. Cl. at 69.
96. Phillips v. IRS, 73 F.3d 939, 942 (9th Cir. 1996).
97. An oft-cited rule finds willfulness if the responsible party clearly ought to have known
there was a grave risk that the withholding taxes were not being paid, and the person was in a
position to easily verify the nonpayment. Wright v. United States, 809 F.2d 425, 427 (7th Cir.
1987); see Cook, 52 Fed. Cl. at 70 (holding "a responsible person is reckless if he knew or should
have known of a risk that the taxes were not being paid, had a reasonable opportunity to
discover and remedy the problem and yet failed to undertake reasonable efforts to ensure
payment"). The Wright court reasoned, "if a high degree of recklessness were required the
purpose of the statute would be thwarted, just by compartmentalizing responsibilities within a
business (however small) and adopting a 'hear no evil-see no evil' policy .. " 809 F.2d at 427.
98. See United States v. Running, 7 F.3d 1293, 1300 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding of willfulness
as a matter of law was reversed when the evidence showed that the responsible person knew the
company was in financial distress, but was unaware of any tax delinquencies); In re Macagnone,
253 B.R. 99, 102 (M.D. Fla. 2000) (during a period of financial distress, failure to inquire into the
payment of the withheld taxes was not reckless where there was no history of delinquencies).
99. See Denbo v. United States, 988 F.2d 1029, 1034 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that plaintiff
"willfully failed to remit federal payroll taxes because he was aware that the corporation had
defaulted in its payment of employment taxes but nevertheless disregarded a known risk by
relying on the assurances of [another] instead of doing more"); Gold v. United States, 506 F.
Supp. 473, 480 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); see also Bedikan, supra note 68, at 267 (discussing Gold).
100. The duty to correct mismanagement, however, is similar to the duty to apply all
business funds to the trust fund tax obligation when the responsible person becomes aware that
it is not being paid, because both duties do not arise until there is actual knowledge of the
misappropriation. See supra note 94. It is only when the responsible person is notified that the
trust fund taxes have not been paid does a duty arise to investigate and correct that failure, and
a failure to do so constitutes recklessness. See Godfrey v. United States, 748 F.2d 1568, 1578
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financial trouble yet continues to pay other creditors without
reasonable inquiry as to the payment of the taxes. 10 1 Further,
delegation of the responsibility to pay trust fund taxes may be reckless
if the person to whom the job is delegated has failed to pay the
government in the past, and the responsible person fails to take
reasonable steps to ensure payment.102
The factual paradigms have greatly reduced the role of the
jury, which in theory should determine willfulness. 10 3 The
development of the paradigms is largely due to the traditional lack of
a reasonable cause exception to willfulness. 10 4 Also, as discussed
below, the perceived inequity of the rigid paradigms has lead to the
10 5
relaxing of the traditional rule in some circumstances.
2. Financial Difficulties and Reasonable Cause
As a general rule, the fact that a business is in financial
distress is irrelevant to the willfulness determination, even if use of
(Fed. Cir. 1984) ("The case law requires ...at least actual notice of the current delinquency to
establish an affirmative duty to act.").
101. Vinick v. Comm'r, 110 F.3d 168, 173 (1st Cir. 1997); IRS v. Blais, 612 F. Supp. 700, 711
(D. Mass. 1985). But see Running, 7 F.3d at 1299 (stating that "knowledge of financial distress,
without more, does not equate to knowledge that the facility was not meeting its tax
obligations").
102. See Phillips v. IRS, 73 F.3d 939, 942 (9th Cir. 1996) ("[Wlhere a chief executive officer..
left cosigned checks with his controller to pay the bills . . . when he knew that the controller had
once failed in the past to pay over the withholding taxes, and the chief executive did nothing to
prevent a recurrence, that was willfulness as a matter of law."); see also Vinick, 110 F.3d at 173.
In Vinick, the court found the willfulness prong met when the plaintiff (in a refund action) knew
that the person in charge of paying the trust fund taxes was unreliable, yet the plaintiff relied on
that person's promises to pay in the future without further investigation. Id. at 174; see also
Thomsen v. United States, 887 F.2d 12, 19-20 (1st Cir. 1989) ("[Ilt is uncontested that [the
treasurer] learned ...that [the vice president] had failed to pay the withholding taxes for the
past three quarters ....Uncontested likewise is the fact that [the treasurer] thereafter delegated
to [the vice president] the responsibility for collecting the accounts receivable and paying the
taxes from monies collected.").
103. See, e.g., Honey v. United States, 963 F.2d 1083, 1087 (8th Cir. 1992); Mardousian v.
United States, No. DKC 97-555, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12035, at *10-11 (D. Md. July 1, 1998)
(holding that when the manager chooses to pay wages and expenses instead of the IRS, that
action is by definition willful, and there is no role for a jury determination).
104. See infra Part III.A.2.
105. See Finley v. United States, 123 F.3d 1342, 1345 (10th Cir. 1997) (en banc) ("[T]he
better way to protect government revenue and preserve a role for the jury in this case and others
without undermining existing precedent is to continue to apply the established paradigms to
identify willful conduct as a matter or law, yet expressly recognize a reasonable cause exception
to the application of those paradigms."). Indeed, these paradigms greatly reduce litigation costs
by avoiding trials and allowing for summary judgment, or allowing for judgments as a matter of
law that void the jury finding as to willfulness. See, e.g., Collins v. United States, 848 F.2d 740
(6th Cir. 1988) (judgment as a matter of law, notwithstanding the jury's verdict); Mardousian,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12035, at *13 (summary judgment for the IRS).
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the taxes is absolutely necessary to keep the business operating. 106 As
the Sixth Circuit noted, "the government cannot be made an unwilling
partner in a floundering business."'10 7 Similarly, willfulness is not
negated by a good faith belief that sufficient funds will be available to
pay the government when the trust fund taxes become due. 0 8 Thus,
employers are not allowed to subject the withheld taxes to the risks of
business. 109
Most circuits adhere to a bright line rule, holding that there is
no reasonable cause exception to the willfulness element of the trust
fund recovery penalty. 110 These courts find no "justifiable excuse" for
a responsible person to knowingly misappropriate trust fund taxes."'
A number of reasons have been offered for this bright line rule. First,
unlike other penalty sections, no reasonable cause exception is
provided for in the statute. 112 Second, a liability standard that does
not incorporate reasonable cause is most consistent with the primary
purpose of the statute, to protect government revenue. 13 Third, a
reasonable cause exception would inject notions of bad motive or

106. See, e.g., Hochstein v. United States, 900 F.2d 543, 548 (2d Cir. 1990).
107. Collins, 848 F.2d at 741-42.
108. Thibodeau v. United States, 828 F.2d 1499, 1505-06 (11th Cir. 1987); see Bowen v.
United States, 836 F.2d 965, 968 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that the expectation of a loan to cover
the employment taxes does not negate willfulness).
109. Thibodeau, 828 F.2d at 1506. Likewise, courts generally hold that willfulness is not
negated if the responsible person was under orders from a superior to pay the trust fund taxes to
a creditor and not to the government. See, e.g., Gephart v. United States, 818 F.2d 469, 475 (6th
Cir. 1987) (noting "it is generally held that one who is a responsible person follows the directions
of a superior not to pay withholding taxes to the government at his peril"); Howard v. United
States, 711 F.2d 729, 735-36 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that following a superior's orders does not
make the responsible person's actions involuntary).
110. See, e.g., Brewery, Inc. v. United States, 33 F.3d 589, 593 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting
"section 6672(a) does not have a reasonable cause exception"); Olsen v. United States, 952 F.2d
236, 241 (8th Cir. 1991) ("This court has held that reasonable cause is no part of the definition of
willfulness." (citation omitted)); Sorenson v. United States, 521 F.2d 325, 329 (9th Cir. 1975)
('"[R]easonable cause' . . . [is a] defense which has been specifically rejected by this court.");
Harrington v. United States, 504 F.2d 1306, 1316 (1st Cir. 1974) ("[A] 'reasonable cause' or
'justifiable excuse' element has no part in .. . [the definition of 'willful']."); Monday v. United
States, 421 F.2d 1210, 1216 (7th Cir. 1970) ("The standard of willfulness should not be construed
to include lack of 'reasonable cause' or justifiable excuse."); In re Treacy, 255 B.R. 656, 665 (E.D.
Pa. 2000) (noting recent decisions of the Third Circuit do not include a reasonable cause
exception).
111. See Monday, 421 F.2d at 1216 (" '[J]ustifiable excuse' [is] inconsistent with the purposes
of Congress to protect the sources of revenue by permitting recovery from those individuals
charged with the responsibility of transferring withheld funds to the Government.").
112. Harrington,504 F.2d at 1316 ("We cannot assume that Congress has made an oversight
in this regard. If any inference is to be drawn, it is that Congress intended lack of 'reasonable
cause' to be an element in certain sections of the statute, and not in others.").
113. Id; Monday, 421 F.2d at 1216.
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specific intent into the civil definition of willfulness. 114 Fourth,
reasonable cause analysis invites "consideration of such misleading
and improper factors as the financial condition of the business or the
demands of creditors.11 5 Finally, this Note argues that a reasonable
cause exception is wholly inconsistent with the duty of loyalty
11 6
applicable to trustees and fiduciaries.
Other circuits that recognize a reasonable cause defense adopt
very limited exceptions. The Fifth Circuit conceptually allows the
defense, but specifically precludes a responsible person who knowingly
pays or allows creditors to be paid with the taxes.1 1 7 The Second
Circuit recognizes a so-called reasonable cause defense, holding that if
the responsible person reasonably believed that the taxes were being
8
paid, the failure to cause the payment of the taxes is not willful."1
This rule is not a true exception to willfulness; instead, it simply
recognizes that reasonable or even negligent mistakes that stop short
of gross negligence are not willful. This standard, like that of the
Fifth Circuit, does not negate willfulness where misappropriation
19
occurs because of financial difficulties.
Only one circuit has adopted a reasonable cause exception
broad enough to allow misappropriation because of financial
difficulties. In Finley v. United States, the Tenth Circuit rejected the
factual paradigm approach, which it perceived as creating a strict
liability standard for willfulness, 20 in favor of a jury determination of
114. Monday, 421 F.2d at 1216; see supra note 89 and accompanying text.
115. Monday, 421 F.2d at 1216; see supra note 106 and accompanying text.
116. See infra Part IV.B.3.
117. See Logal v. United States, 195 F.3d 229, 233 (5th Cir. 1999). This exception originated
in Newsome v. United States, 431 F.2d 742, 747 (5th Cir. 1970), but the Fifth Circuit has never
used it to negate a finding of willfulness as a matter of law. Logal, 195 F.3d at 233 (noting "no
taxpayer has yet carried that pail up the hill" (quoting Bowen v. United States, 836 F.2d 965,
968 (5th Cir. 1988))); cf. Thosteson v. United States, 331 F.3d 1294, 1301 (11th Cir. 2003)
(declining to decide whether a reasonable cause exception exists, but noting that even if one did,
it would not apply to cases where the plaintiff consciously paid other creditors with knowledge
that the trust fund taxes had not been paid); Bell v. United States, No. I:99CV2102, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 6866, at *11 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 12, 2002) (holding that even if a reasonable cause
defense were viable, it would have no place where the trust fund tax obligation was accorded
second class status to the bills).
118. Winter v. United States, 196 F.3d 339, 345 (2d Cir. 1999).
119. See Powers v. United States, No. 00-6229, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 5538, at *6-7 (2d Cir.
Mar. 19, 2001) ("[Plaintiff] directed that funds ... be used to pay the... payroll, rather than the
back taxes, and ... was aware that [his company] would have insufficient funds to cover the
taxes owed .... [Plaintiffs] conduct is therefore willful as a matter of law."); In re Treacy, 255
B.R. 656, 665 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (standard not met where 'Treacy was admittedly aware that
employment taxes were owed to the government at times when he wrote and issued checks to
other creditors, and took no steps to rectify the situation").
120. By creating a strict liability standard for willfulness, the broad, as-a-matter-of-law,
factual paradigms displace the jury in what is a quintessential jury issue. United States v.
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willfulness based upon the totality of the circumstances. 12 1 The
taxpayer must be given an opportunity to "meaningfully distinguish
his case before a jury based on the relative degree of willfulness or the
' 122
presence of extenuating circumstances."
To this end, the court fashioned a reasonable cause exception to
the application of the established factual paradigms. 123 Based on the
nature of the trust recovery penalty, however, a broad exception based
merely on the exercise of ordinary business care and prudence by the
responsible person, similar to the reasonable cause exceptions of the
failure-to-pay penalties, 124 was inappropriate. 1 25 Instead, the court
limited the exception to circumstances where the responsible person
made reasonable efforts to protect the trust funds, but those efforts
were frustrated by circumstances outside his control. 26 To date, only
two as-a-matter-of-law holdings have been reversed on appeal in the
Tenth Circuit and, in both cases, the company's assets had been seized
by third parties.' 27 Thus, the scope of the reasonable cause exception
may be quite limited. 28 Of course, Finley remains the minority view,
and whether it is the start of a trend in the law remains to be seen.
Finley, 123 F.3d 1342, 1346-47 (10th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Any curtailment of the jury function
must be "carefully scrutinized," and the factual paradigms fail this scrutiny because the jury is
stopped from fully evaluating the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the
responsible person acted willfully. See id. The court suggests that a finding to the contrary would
be against the reasonable expectations of Congress in enacting section 6672. See id. at 1347 n.4.
121. See id.at 1347.
122. Id. at 1346.
123. Id. at 1348. Thus, the as-a-matter-of-law rulings still are possible in the Tenth Circuit.
124. See infra Part III.B.
125. Specifically, "[s]ince § 6672 does not raise a concern regarding the protection of a
taxpayer from harsh, additional penalties imposed for purposes of punishment and deterrence, it
would be inappropriate to adopt a lenient reasonable cause exception like that applied to income
tax penalties, i.e. ordinary business care and prudence." Finley, 123 F.3d at 1348.
126. Id. After a jury verdict of not willful, the lower court in Finley directed a verdict for the
government based on a showing of a failure to investigate and correct mismanagement after the
responsible person received notice of the tax deficiency. Id. at 1344. Because of the new
reasonable cause exception, this ruling, based on an as-a-matter-of-law factual paradigm, was
reversed and remanded for a new trial. Id. at 1350.
127. In Finley, the accounts of the employer were frozen by their bank, and when the
responsible person deposited sufficient funds to cover the tax obligation, the bank instead
applied the deposit to the outstanding debt of the corporation. Id. at 1343-44. Similarly, in
Howell v. United States, while the responsible person made a voluntary decision to prefer
business creditors, the corporation's assets soon were seized by insurance underwriters. 164 F.3d
523, 524, 526-27 (10th Cir. 1999). A question of fact concerning reasonable efforts existed where
evidence showed that the responsible person historically left a cushion within the company's
escrow accounts with which to pay the trust fund taxes, and the IRS had cooperated with this
past practice. Id. at 527.
128. In cases where the company's assets are not out of the responsible person's control, as-amatter-of-law holdings will likely withstand review, though the Tenth Circuit has not limited the
control element to circumstances where the responsible person actually loses control of the
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B. Importation of Willfulness Principlesinto the Failure-To-Payand
Deposit Penalty Provisions'Reasonable Cause Exceptions
Unlike the reasonable cause exception of the trust fund
recovery penalty, the reasonable cause exceptions of the failure-to-pay
penalties are explicitly provided by statute.'2 9 A broader view of
reasonable cause is generally warranted for the failure-to-pay
penalties, based on the purpose of the provisions. Any judicially
created reasonable cause exception to the trust fund recovery penalty
130
must be admittedly narrow to further the purposes of the statute.
Unlike normal penalty provisions, the trust fund recovery "penalty"
serves a broader purpose because it allows collection of the tax from
someone who is not the primary obligor. 13'
Thus, it protects
government revenue that would otherwise be lost, which is something
other penalty provisions cannot ensure. 32 This broader purpose
makes the trust fund recovery penalty more important to tax

company's assets. See Mardousian v. United States, No. DKC 97-555, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12035, at *9-10 (D. Md. July 1, 1998) (finding Finley inapplicable where the plaintiff never
lacked control over the company's assets); see also In re Treacy, 255 B.R. 656, 665 (E.D. Pa. 2000)
(holding Finley inapplicable where the responsible person paid creditors knowing the
employment taxes were owed); Stauffer v. United States, No. 97-M-1566, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14213, at *10-11 (D. Colo. Aug. 27, 1998) (granting summary judgment for government under
similar circumstances despite Finley). The Finley court noted that because of the limited scope of
the exception, most cases that fit into the factual paradigms still would qualify for as-a-matterof-law holdings. Finley, 123 F.3d at 1349 (applying the standard that "no reasonable jury" could
find reasonable cause); see Stauffer, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14213, at *10 (holding Finley does not
apply as a matter of law where the responsible person claims he relied on the IRS, which had
told him that he needed only stay current on the tax and "that they would worry about the pastdue taxes later").
129. See I.R.C. §§ 6651(a)(2)-(3), 6656(a) (2000) ("[D]ue to reasonable cause and not due to
willful neglect"). Willful neglect is interpreted by the Supreme Court to mean a refusal to pay
taxes. United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 245 n.3 (1985). Although it is necessary to show both
elements, a showing of reasonable cause rules out willful neglect; therefore, the cases, and this
Note, focus only on the reasonable cause element. See, e.g., Joyce L. Sugawara et al., Defining
Reasonableness Before the Internal Revenue Service, L.A. LAW., May 2000, at 23, 23, WL 23-May
LALAW 23.
130. See Finley, 123 F.3d at 1348 ("By so limiting the elements of reasonable cause ... we...
maintain the ability to zealously protect government revenue via the application of certain
factual paradigms widely-recognized and accepted as 'willful conduct.' ").
131. Most penalty provisions serve both a deterrence purpose, in that they encourage
voluntary compliance with the law, and a punishment purpose, in that they impose fines if the
law is broken. So, while they are collection devices in the sense that they help ensure payment,
they cannot help the government recover if the taxpayer is wholly unable to pay. See supra note
14; cf. Finley, 123 F.3d at 1348 (distinguishing section 6672 from penalties that impose fines for
purposes of deterrence and punishment). The trust fund recovery penalty, however, does allow
the government to recover even if the taxpayer is unable to pay.
132. See Finley, 123 F.3d at 1348 (noting section 6672 is only a means of insuring tax
payment); see also supra note 66.
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collection, and therefore calls for a more narrowly defined reasonable
cause exception.
In addition, a broader reasonable cause exception is warranted
for the failure-to-pay penalties due to their scope. Because they also
apply to direct tax obligations, it is logical that a more lenient
reasonable cause exception would apply than in the case of the trust
fund recovery penalty.133
This does not mean, however, that
reasonable cause should be given the same meaning in the trust fund
and the direct tax contexts. 134 When determining reasonable cause,
courts must note this crucial distinction and take care not to apply
trust fund misappropriation principles to direct taxes.
1. General Principles
Under the Treasury Regulations, the lack of sufficient funds to
pay direct taxes constitutes reasonable cause only if the taxpayer can
show that he exercised ordinary business care and prudence in
providing for payment, but would have suffered an undue hardship if
timely payment was made. 135 "Undue hardship" requires more than
simply an inconvenience to the taxpayer. Instead, the taxpayer must
show that he would have suffered a substantial financial loss if he had
paid the taxes on time. 136 The Regulations provide that, in making
this determination, "all the facts and circumstances of the taxpayer's
financial condition" must be considered.137
Importantly, the
Regulations also provide that the nature of the tax is also relevant.
Thus, what may constitute reasonable cause for the nonpayment of
direct taxes may not constitute reasonable cause for the nonpayment
of trust fund taxes.13 8 The combined effect of these two regulatory
directives is the crux of the division in authority as to whether
financial conditions are relevant in the trust fund tax context. 139
In determining whether the failure to pay direct taxes is
reasonable, consideration of a business's financial condition is entirely
consistent with the policy underlying the failure-to-pay penalty

133. The failure-to-pay penalty applies to trust fund and direct taxes, including the income,
estate, and gift taxes. See Alan J. Tarr & Carol F. Burger, Civil Tax Penalties 634 Tax Mgt. A-9
(BNA) (2002).
134. See infra notes 138, 146, 228-229 and accompanying text.
.135. Treas. Reg. § 301.6651-1(c)(1) (as amended in 2000).
136. Treas. Reg. § 1.6161-1(b) (as amended in 1973).
137. Treas. Reg. § 301.6651-1(c)(1).
138. Id. § 301.6651-1(c)(2).
139. See infra Part III.B.2-.3.
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provisions. 140 The failure to pay trust fund taxes, however, involves
entirely different policy considerations and an entirely different type
of obligation. In the trust fund recovery penalty context, courts almost
universally refuse to excuse employees from misappropriation because
of financial difficulties.1 4 1 Federal courts are split as to whether the
same situation excuses the employer from the failure-to-pay penalties.
Because of the similarities between the two situations, willfulness
jurisprudence influences how the courts approach this issue.
2. The Sixth Circuit: No Excuse for Misappropriation
The Sixth Circuit was the first to address whether the failure42
to-pay penalty would apply to misappropriation without exception.
In Brewery, a restaurant owner properly withheld employment taxes
for two years, yet failed to pay them to the government, opting instead
to use the funds to finance his struggling business. 4 3 Upon financial
recovery, and subsequent payment of the taxes, the taxpayer sought
144
and was denied a refund of the failure-to-pay penalties assessed.
The court adopted a per se rule, holding that "financial
difficulties can never constitute reasonable cause to excuse the
45
penalties for nonpayment of withholding taxes by an employer."'
The court expressed two bases for this rule. First, the court read the
regulations as providing for heightened scrutiny in the trust fund tax
context, requiring "particularly compelling facts and circumstances" to

140. See, e.g., United States v. Finley, 123 F.3d 1342, 1348 (10th Cir. 1997) (explaining that
the exception may protect the taxpayer from the imposition of "harsh, additional penalties
imposed for purposes of punishment and deterrence").
141. See supra notes 106-128 and accompanying text.
142. Brewery, Inc. v. United States, 33 F.3d 589, 592-93 (6th Cir. 1994).
143. In Brewery, two events caused the taxpayer's restaurant's financial difficulties. See id.
at 591. First, during a remodeling project, the taxpayer and several adjoining property owners
agreed to share the cost of a new sewer system; however, when one of the property owners went
bankrupt, the taxpayer's actual project cost was much higher than expected. Id. Second, when
the city decided to renovate a bridge directly in front of the taxpayer, its main access point was
blocked, resulting in a major loss in business. Id. With operating losses, the restaurant was
forced to pick and choose whom it would pay, and the taxpayer "considered the IRS one of those
creditors." Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 592; see In re McTyre Trucking Co., 223 B.R. 588, 593 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1998); In
re Uptown Printing Co., 186 B.R. 904, 906-07 (Bankr. E.D. La. 1995); In re Sykes & Sons, Inc.,
188 B.R. 507, 513 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995); In re Frederick Savage, Inc., 179 B.R. 342, 348 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1995). This rule is in line with the majority of the lower federal courts that addressed
this issue prior to Brewery. See, e.g., C.J. Rogers, Inc. v. United States, No. 89-70209, 1990 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 18031, at *5-6 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 17, 1990); Wolfe v. United States, 612 F. Supp. 605,
608 (D. Mont. 1985).
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find reasonable cause, a standard that cannot be met when the
146
employer misappropriates trust fund taxes.
Second, and more important, the court found the reasoning of
its willfulness jurisprudence to be persuasive in this context. 147 The
fact that the trust fund recovery penalty is levied against employees,
while the failure-to-pay penalties are levied against the employer, is
an irrelevant distinction. 148 The nature of the taxes, being held in
trust, binds the two rules together: misappropriation of government
property to pay business expenses is not justifiable, even if it is
absolutely necessary to keep the business operating.149
3. The Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits: Excusing Misappropriation
Other circuits that have addressed this issue reject the per se
rule of Brewery, holding that financial difficulties can be considered in
the determination of reasonable cause for the nonpayment of trust
fund taxes. 150 The leading case for the majority rule, Fran Corp. v.
United States, did not address the conceptual differences between

146. See Brewery, 33 F.3d at 592 ("[Tlhe facts and circumstances required to establish
reasonable cause must be particularly compelling."); see also In re McTyre, 223 B.R. at 593
("[T]he test for 'reasonable cause' is more stringent when trust fund taxes are at issue."); C.J.
Rogers, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18031, at *4-5 (noting court decisions that did not adopt the per se
rule ignored this language in the Regulations).
147. Brewery, 33 F.3d at 592-93 (citing Collins v. United States, 848 F.2d 740 (6th Cir. 1988),
which is a willfulness case).
148. See id. at 593.
149. Id. at 593; see Norwalk Liquidating, Inc. v. United States, 159 F. Supp. 2d 684, 690-92
(N.D. Ohio 2001) (concluding that using trust funds to sustain a company during a downward
spiral is not reasonable cause as a matter of law); Wolfe, 612 F. Supp. at 608 ("Almost every nonwillful failure to pay taxes is the result of financial difficulties."); In re McTyre, 223 B.R. at 593
("[T]he need for capital, even capital necessary to keep the business operating, is not reasonable
cause."). To hold otherwise would make the government "an unwilling partner in a floundering
business" and would allow taxpayers to "self-execute a government loan" by using government
funds penalty free. Brewery, 33 F.3d at 593 (citing Collins, 848 F.2d at 742); see also In re
Frederick Savage, Inc., 179 B.R. at 348 ("If every taxpayer's cash flow problems were sufficient to
justify delay in payment of taxes, such an exception would swallow the rule."). Moreover,
allowing businesses to postpone paying tax obligations until economic conditions improve would
restrict severely the ability of the government to raise revenue. Wolfe, 612 F. Supp. at 608. The
Brewery court also extended its per se rule to the nontrust fund employment taxes as well,
holding that the employer's share of FICA is more closely analogous to trust fund taxes than
direct income tax obligations. 33 F.3d at 593-94. This Note argues that courts should clearly
distinguish between trust fund and nontrust fund taxes in applying reasonable cause. Whether
the Brewery court's application of the per se rule to nontrust fund employment taxes is correct is
outside the scope of this Note.
150. See Van Camp & Bennion v. United States, 251 F.3d 862, 868 (9th Cir. 2001); E. Wind
Indus. v. United States, 196 F.3d 499, 500 (3d Cir. 1999); Fran Corp. v. United States, 164 F.3d
814, 818 (2d Cir. 1999); Q.E.D., Inc. v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 140, 145-47 (2003).
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15 1
trust fund taxes and direct taxes, the focus of the Brewery decision.
Its holding was based entirely upon the fact that neither the statutes
nor the regulations distinguish between trust fund and direct taxes,
and neither specifically bars the consideration of financial difficulties
in the case of latter but not the former. 152 Instead, the regulations
specifically provide that the taxpayer's financial condition is a
relevant consideration in determining ordinary care. 15 3 In addition,
while the Regulations do call for "heightened scrutiny" with respect to
trust fund taxes, this requires only that type of tax at issue is simply
another factor considered in the ordinary care analysis, not that the
type of tax alone justifies ignoring the financial difficulties of a
business.1 54 Finally, according to the court, if the per se rule were
adopted, it would effectively read the reasonable cause exception out
1 55
of the statute.
Recognizing the danger of its rule, the court noted that
financial difficulties would be a justifiable excuse only in "rare"
cases.1 56 The Fran case did not qualify as such because the taxpayer
had failed to exercise ordinary business care by continuing to make
payments that were not essential to the preservation of the
business. 157 The court, in effect, adopted an essential creditor rule

151. See 164 F.3d 814 (2d Cir. 1999). In Fran, the taxpayer, an electrical contractor, faced
severe financial difficulties after the State of New York refused to pay progress and cost overrun
payments it owed the taxpayer. Id. at 815. Additionally, a private college defaulted entirely on
its obligations to the taxpayer. Id. The State eventually paid the taxpayer, but in the intervening
year, the taxpayer had insufficient cash to pay both its creditors and the government. Id. The
taxpayer choose to pay its creditors with the employment taxes it withheld from its employees.
Id.
152. Id. at 818. The Court found this most significant for the failure-to-deposit penalty,
which specifically applies to employment taxes and yet neither requires a higher standard nor
requires the courts not to consider financial difficulties. Id. As mentioned previously, however,
not all employment taxes are trust fund taxes. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
153. Treas. Reg. § 301.6651-1(c)(1) (as amended in 2000). Moreover, since this language long
has been a part of the regulations, it has the effect of law due to congressional silence on the
issue. Fran, 164 F.3d at 818.
154. Fran, 164 F.3d at 819. More stringent standards are necessary, however, for trust fund
taxes. E. Wind, 196 F.3d at 509.
155. Fran, 164 F.3d at 819; see Van Camp & Bennion, 251 F.3d at 868 ("If the potential ruin
of a corporation is not relevant, then the reasonable cause exception is virtually meaningless.").
This is not the case, since there are a number of situations that would constitute reasonable
cause even for trust fund taxes. See infra notes 210, 228.
156. Fran, 164 F.3d at 819. The court recognized the Brewery concern that the government
could be made an unwilling partner in a floundering business. Id.
157. See id. at 819-20. Specifically, the taxpayer paid rent to its president even though the
president owed the taxpayer almost $150,000 from a loan, which under ordinary care would have
been suspended. Id. at 819. The taxpayer continued to lease and repair cars that were not
essential to the business, including a Porsche. Id. at 819-20. Finally, the taxpayer continued to
pay for "lavish and extravagant" entertainment expenses, including events not necessary for its
business. Id. at 820. The court concluded as follows: "Perhaps most important is Fran's failure to
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which allows misappropriation if the taxes are used to pay only those
creditors, including employees, necessary to keep the business
operating.158 It therefore allows for misappropriation if the need is
great enough.
One of the rationales of Brewery was the notion that if the
employer could use withheld funds in its business, the government
would become an "unwilling partner" of the enterprise. 159 Other courts
have since seized on this idea, finding that when the government is
somehow a "willing partner" in the business or is the cause of the
company's financial difficulties, the reasonable cause exception might
be met. 160 In East Wind Industries, Inc. v. United States, the Third
Circuit held that where the illegal conduct of a government employee
directly caused the taxpayer's financial difficulties, the government
had become a willing partner in the business such that the
nonpayment of the taxes was excused.161
East Wind involved egregious facts and arguably can be limited
to cases of illegal conduct by government officials. Courts appear
willing, however, to read the willing partner rule more broadly,
allowing for misappropriation where the employer can show some
direct and substantial causal link between the actions of the
government, illegal or legal, and the taxpayer's financial difficulties.1 62
provide any evidence to show that it placed its obligations to the IRS before those to any and all
creditors not directly related to the two projects that defaulted. Absent such a showing, Fran
cannot demonstrate that it acted prudently in disregarding its legal obligations to pay and
deposit the employment taxes." Id.; see also Synergy Staffing, Inc. v. IRS, 323 F.3d 1157, 1160
(9th Cir. 2003) (finding the taxpayer cannot prevail unless it shows how it spent its available
funds in lieu of paying its taxes).
158. See, e.g., E. Wind, 196 F.3d at 509-10 (noting that the taxpayer only paid its essential
creditors); PARCC Health Care, Inc. v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 2d 435, 444 (D. Conn. 2002)
(stating that the taxpayer must show that payments were necessary to the survival of the
business).
159. Brewery, Inc. v. United States, 33 F.3d 589, 592-93 (6th Cir. 1994).
160. See E. Wind, 196 F.3d at 507, 512-13; PARCC, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 444; In re Gordon SelWay, Inc., No. 88-04525, Chapter 7, 1995 Bankr. LEXIS 1109, at *18-19 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. July
24, 1995) (recognizing that this situation might be an exception to the Brewery per se rule, for
"equity or estoppel" reasons).
161. E. Wind, 196 F.3d at 512-13. The taxpayer in that case was a government contractor
whose contracts went through various agencies of the Department of Defense. Id. at 501. When
employees of those agencies began soliciting bribes in exchange for contracts, the taxpayer
initially refused, and as a result, lost over five million dollars due to retaliatory action by the
corrupt employees. Id. at 501-02. Because of the financial difficulties this caused, the taxpayer
accrued but did not pay employment taxes, and, importantly, the court found that all the
payments it made were to essential creditors and employees. Id. at 508-09. The court concluded,
"By its actions, the Government, through the Defense Agencies, became a willing partner in a
floundering business." Id. at 512-13.
162. It appears that in order for the government to be a willing partner, it must have a
sufficiently direct or substantial relationship to the financial difficulties of the taxpayer. In re
Gordon Sel-Way, 1995 Bankr. LEXIS 1109, at *25 (finding the government's role in causing the
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Both the willing partner rule and the essential creditor rule are
inconsistent with the application of general trust principles to
misappropriation of trust fund taxes.
IV. TRUST PRINCIPLES AND ENFORCING THE SECTION 7501 TRUST
Judicial interpretation of the penalty provisions combined with
the existence and scope of any reasonable cause exceptions to the
penalties determine the extent to which a Code trust will be enforced.
Under reasonable cause exceptions, the essential creditor rule, the
willing partner rule, and the Finley rule, the employer can justifiably
raid the trust property that it holds in trust for the government in
various circumstances. 163 To the extent that these exceptions allow for
misappropriation, they are wholly inconsistent with the basic
fiduciary principles that govern all trust relationships.
A Code trust and its accompanying taxes vary widely from the
typical common law trust and trust property. First, a Code trust is
created in an abstract amount, rather than in the actual dollars
withheld, while common law trusts require the designation of specified
property as trust property. 16 4 Second, the powers and duties of a Code
trustee are different from those of a common law trustee. 16 5 For these
reasons, it is impossible to apply wholesale common law trust
principles to the Code trust context.
Still, the trustee's fiduciary duty of loyalty, which underlies all
trust relationships, can and should be applied to a Code trust to limit
the employer's discretion over the withheld taxes. Generally, a
trustee is given broad discretion over the trust property, and for that
reason, the common law trustee is held to a strict duty of loyalty. 166 A
Code trustee likewise possesses broad discretion over the trust
property until the date the taxes are required to be deposited or paid.
Therefore, the employer should be held to the same duty of loyalty as
a common law trustee. First, in using the term "trust," Congress
intended to import this basic trust principle into the withholding
financial problems to be 'limited, distant, and not sufficiently directly related"); cf. E. Wind, 196
F.3d at 511 (finding that if the government had paid the taxpayer what it was owed, the
taxpayer would not have experienced the financial difficulties); PARCC, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 44445 (finding a material question of fact exists as to whether the government is a willing partner in
the "highly regulated" nursing home business).
163. See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing Finley), Part III.B.3 (discussing essential creditor and
willing partner rules).
164. Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 62 (1990).
165. See infra Part IA-B.
166. See, e.g, Karen E. Boxx, The Durable Power of Attorney's Place in the Family of
FiduciaryRelationships, 36 GA. L. REV. 1, 19 (2001).
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context. Alternatively, if Congress's intent is unclear, the employer
owes the government fiduciary loyalty by virtue of its control over its
property. 167

A. The Nature of the Common Law Trust Compared to the Code Trust
A trust is an equitable obligation that binds the trustee to
exercise discretion over property in which he has control for the
benefit of other persons, the beneficiaries. 168 This definition also fits a
Code trust, where the employer exercises discretion over the taxes,
which it holds for the benefit of the government until the taxes become
due. However, the similarities between common law trusts and Code
trusts end at this level of generality. A Code trust is not a common
law trust. 169

First, a common law trust cannot exist unless an ascertainable
and transferable property interest is identified as the trust
property. 170 A Code trust, in contrast, creates a trust in the abstract
amount withheld, "a dollar figure not tied to any particular assets,"
171
and not in the actual dollars withheld.
Second, the rights of a Code trustee with respect to the trust
property are much more limited than those of a common law trustee.
A common law trust is comprised of two estates: the equitable estate
owned by the beneficiary and the legal estate owned by the trustee. 172
As legal owner of the trust property, the trustee has numerous
property rights, including the right to possess and alienate the
property. 73 Still, the beneficiary owns the right to benefit from the
167. See infra Part IV.B.1. Once establishing the basic duties of the employer as trustee, this
Part uses basic trust principles to propose the proper course of interpreting and applying the
section 7501 trust and its related penalties. The common law of trusts is extensive, and this Note
does not attempt a comprehensive review of trusts; however, well-settled and general trust
principles obviously influenced Congress in deciding to call the withheld amount "trust" funds.
These principles, therefore, should influence the courts in approaching questions regarding trust
fund taxes.
168. CHARLES E. ROUNDS, JR., LORING: A TRUSTEE'S HANDBOOK 4 (2002) (citing Martyn

Frost, Overview of Trusts in England and Wales, in TRUST IN PRIME JURISDICTIONS 13 (Alon
Kaplan ed., 2000)). The trustee may also be a beneficiary in common law trusts. Id. at 4 n.12.
169. Id. at 570.
170. Begier, 496 U.S. at 62.
171. Id. The lack of identifiable trust property leads to problems, however, especially in
tracing the trust fund taxes in bankruptcy. See id. at 70 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Section 7501
obviously intends to give the United States the advantages of a trust beneficiary with respect to
collected and withheld taxes. Unfortunately, it does not always succeed in doing so. A trust
without a res can no more be created by legislative decree than can a pink rock-candy
mountain.").
172. ROUNDS, supra note 168, at 66.
173. Id. at 66, 69.
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trust property, such that the trustee's creditors have no right to it.174
A Code trustee, however, has no such legal estate in withheld taxes.
According to most courts, the taxes are for the exclusive use of the
government, and the employer is simply obligated to hold the taxes
and not expose them to any business or investment risk. 175
In most respects, a Code trust cannot truly be considered a
trust at all, and Congress clearly did not intend to create the
equivalent of a common law trust. Indeed, the primary goal was to
give the government, as a trust beneficiary, preference over business
creditors in bankruptcy.1 76
This does not mean, however, that
Congress did not intend to apply trust principles to the withheld
amounts, since "the common law of trusts is not binding on
Congress." 1 77 Congress' intent to treat employers as trustees and
withheld taxes as trust property is evident in the legislative history of
section 7501 which states that "under existing law the liability of the
person collecting and withholding the taxes to pay over the amount is
merely a debt, and he cannot be treated as a trustee or proceeded
against by distraint."1 78
By enacting the Code trust, Congress
intended to treat the collection of withheld taxes differently from the
collection of direct taxes, where the government is essentially a
1 79
creditor.

174. Id. at 396.
175. The amount withheld is entirely owned by the government (with the employee entitled
to the excess) and is for the exclusive use of the government. Gephert v. United States, 818 F.2d
469. 472 (6th Cir. 1987). Any use of the trust funds for other purposes is a violation of the trust.
See, e.g., id.; see also infra Part IV.B.1 (discussing the duty of care).
176. See generally Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53 (1990); Rodney, supra note 41, at 454-60.
177. Begier, 496 U.S. at 62 n.4. The common law of trusts would not allow for the
application of trust principles to withheld amounts because a Code trust cannot be considered a
trust in the traditional sense. However, the common law of trust does not bind Congress's ability
to apply trust principles to other arrangements. So, Congress can apply trust principles to
situations, like the Code trust, in which the common law would not apply trust principles.
178. Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238, 255 (1978) (quoting S. REP. NO. 73-558, at 53
(1934) (emphasis added)). Justice Scalia complains that the lack of identification of withheld
funds creates enormous tracing problems. Begier, 496 U.S. at 71. However, such a question is
unimportant for present purposes, because it does not affect the duty of loyalty of the
employer/trustee not to use the trust funds for business expenses.
179. There can be no other interpretation of Congress's creation of section 7501. If the only
thought was of bankruptcy preference, Congress could have simply amended the Bankruptcy
Code to give the withholding taxes higher preference over other claims. By using the specific
legal term "trust," Congress obviously intended to import the most basic trust concept-the
fiduciary duty.
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B. The FiduciaryDuty of the Code Trustee
'80
A trust represents a "quintessential fiduciary relationship."'
As such, the fiduciary duties of a trustee apply to an employer,
considering the special nature of a Code trust. One may argue that
the Code trust does not impose common law fiduciary duties on the
employer, since it is admittedly not a common law trust. Even so,
outside the trust concept, based on its relationship to the property and
to the government, the employer is a fiduciary of the government.

1. The Employer as a Fiduciary
In all fiduciary relationships, the beneficiary entrusts the
fiduciary with control over an asset.1 8 ' Mere discretion over another's
assets does not make one a fiduciary; instead, the fiduciary also acts
on behalf of the beneficiary.18 2 One commentator defines a fiduciary
as one who "acts on behalf of another party . . . while exercising
discretion with respect to a critical resource belonging to the
beneficiary."' 8 3
In this context, "discretion" is equated with
opportunism, the power to use or work with the critical resource in a
manner that exposes the beneficiary to harm that cannot reasonably
84
be evaded through self-help.
The withholding system creates such a relationship. The
employer acts as the agent of the government by collecting taxes
under the authority granted to it by the government. This agency
relationship clearly satisfies the "on behalf of' requirement. 8 5 After
collection, the employer has unlimited discretion over the
government's property. While discretion is not to be equated with
mere access to the critical resource,18 6 the Code permits the use of the

180. D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV.
1399, 1452 (2002).
181. Cooter & Freedman, supra note 5, at 1046.
182. Smith, supra note 180, at 1438. A person acts on behalf of another party when they act
primarily for the benefit of that party. See id. at 1439.
183. Id. at 1402 (emphasis omitted). Two classic definitions state that one is a fiduciary if
"the law demands of one party an unusually high standard of ethical or moral conduct with
reference to another," or where there is a duty "on the part of the fiduciary to act for the benefit
of the other party to the relation as to matters within the scope of the relation." Boxx, supra note
166, at 15-16. Neither definition, however, identifies when the relationship usually arises. Id. at
16.
184. Smith, supra note 180, at 1444, 1449. "Where self-help protection of the critical resource
is strong, the case for judicial protection ... is weak, and vice versa." Id. at 1443.
185. See id. at 1438-39. In fact, the employer is called a "withholding agent." See I.R.C. §
7701(16) (2000).
186. See Smith, supra note 180, at 1448-49.
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withheld taxes by the employer1 8 7 in a manner that exposes the
government to harm in the form of late payment or nonpayment.1 8 8 In
sum, like the common law trustee, the employer occupies the position
of a fiduciary.
The common law fiduciary relationship exposes the beneficiary
to two harms: misappropriation and negligent management of
assets. 8 9 In response, the fiduciary has two distinct duties: care and
loyalty.190 The duty of loyalty combats the first potential harm by
prohibiting the trustee from entering into self-interested transactions,
self-dealing, or otherwise misappropriating the trust property. 191 The
duty of care combats the second potential harm by requiring the
fiduciary to make productive use of the trust property and to act
92
prudently in all dealings with the property.'
The duty of care of the Code trustee, due to the special nature
of the trust, is virtually nonexistent, insofar as it would require the
employer to make productive use of the withheld funds. However, the
special nature of the Code trust does not affect the duty of loyalty. If
the trust fund taxes are used in such a way that no funds are
available to satisfy the tax obligations when due, the employer
breaches its duty of loyalty by entering into self-regarding
transactions that misappropriate the taxes for its own use. 93 The
penalty provisions can only deter this misappropriation, not avoid it.
When misappropriation is excused under the doctrine of reasonable
cause, courts depart sharply from this principle.

187. See infra Part IV.B.2.
188. See Smith, supra note 180, at 1449 (discretion "connotes the power to use or work with
the" asset). The cases throughout this Note illustrate just how much discretion the employers

have over the withheld funds, and they clearly have the power to use the funds in a way that
potentially harms the government by exposing the funds to the business risks of troubled or
failing companies. Whether the harm is late or nonpayment of the taxes, the harm is directly
caused by the discretion the employer has over the withheld funds.
189. Cooter & Freedman, supra note 5, at 1047.
190. See, e.g., Boxx, supra note 166, at 17.
191. See Boxx, supra note 166, at 17-18; Cooter & Freedman, supra note 5, at 1047.
According to Gordon Smith, the duty of loyalty is the duty "to refrain from self-interested
behavior that constitutes a wrong to the beneficiary as a result of the fiduciary exercising
discretion with respect to the beneficiary's critical resources." Smith, supra note 180, at 1407.
192. See Boxx, supra note 166, at 18; Cooter & Freedman, supra note 5, at 1047.
193. A "self-regarding' transaction is a breach of the duty of loyalty in that it benefits the
fiduciary at the beneficiary's expense. Cooter & Freedman, supra note 5, at 1048. Because the
fiduciary is obligated to place the interests of the beneficiary before her own, she is obligated
only to undertake "other-regarding" acts. Id.
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2. The Modified Duty of Care
The common law duty of care requires the trustee to make the
trust property productive, usually requiring the trustee to invest the
property.194 Under the prudent investor rule, so long as the trustee
acts reasonably in investing, the duty of care is satisfied. 95 This
simply recognizes that there is no such thing as a risk free
investment, and the trustee is not the insurer of the trust property.196
By contrast, Code trusts do not require an employer to make
the withheld fund productive. In fact, employers are discouraged from
investing the withheld funds in their business or otherwise. Courts
routinely say that the funds are for the "exclusive use of the
government" 197 and that an employer cannot subject the withheld
funds to business or investment risks.1 98 This is the ideal view from
the government's perspective, but it is not the reality of the Code
trust. Because the Code does not impress a trust in the actual dollars
withheld, does not penalize the mere use of the trust fund taxes, and
does not require segregation, 99 the employer is, in fact, free to use the
withheld funds in its business so long as it has sufficient funds to pay

194. ROUNDS, supra note 168, at 261.
195. Id. at 199.
196. Id. at 261. The prudent investor rule originally was stated as follows: "All that can be
required of a trustee to invest, is, that he shall conduct himself faithfully and exercise a sound
discretion. He is to observe how men of prudence, discretion and intelligence manage their own
affairs, not in regard to speculation but in regard to the permanent disposition of their funds,
considering the probable income, as well as the probable safety of the capital to be invested."
Harvard Coll. v. Amory, 26 Mass. 446, 461 (1830).
197. See, e.g., Brewery, Inc. v. United States, 33 F.3d 589, 593 (6th Cir. 1994) ("[Tjhese trust
fund taxes are for the exclusive use of the government ....
").
198. See, e.g., Thibodeau v. United States, 828 F.2d 1499, 1505-06 (11th Cir. 1987).
199. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text. A common law trustee is required to keep
the trust property segregated from the trustee's property. See ROUNDS, supra note 168, at 250.
Commingling of trust funds with personal funds constitutes a breach of trust and, in some states,
is a criminal act. See id. In contrast, Code trustees are not required to segregate the withheld
taxes from general funds, but as mentioned, segregation may be required of certain repeat
offenders, upon notice, and under threat of criminal penalty. See supra note 35. A universal
segregation requirement could have two positive effects. First, it could lessen, but definitely
would not eliminate, the misappropriation problem. One commentator suggests that imposing a
duty to segregate tax funds when payroll is processed would help solve the misappropriation
problem without causing administrative burdens. See Bedikan, supra note 68, at 270. Employers
could implement such a system by creating special payroll bank accounts which are funded prior
to pay day with the full amount of gross wages. When paychecks are cashed with the net wage
amounts withdrawn from the account, the balance of the account after all the checks are cashed
represents the trust fund tax amounts. These trust fund tax amounts stay in the bank account
until paid to the government. Second, the proposed system would substantially benefit the
government in reaching trust funds taxes in bankruptcy. See supra note 41. A segregation
requirement, however, would most definitely create serious administrative burdens for all
employers, and a full examination of segregation is outside the scope of this Note.
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the government when the taxes are due. An employer can legally
satisfy the tax obligation with any funds from its general account,
including funds that have been "used" by the employer for business
200
purposes, such as by earning interest.
This does not mean that any liability for losing the withheld
funds is predicated on a duty of care. If the employer does decide to
invest the withheld funds, Code trusts contain no safe harbor prudent
investor rule; even reasonable investments that result in a failure to
make the tax payments result in liability. 20 1 In this sense, the
employer as trustee acts as the insurer of the trust funds, at least to
the extent reasonable cause is not recognized, and, if the trustee
himself cannot pay, then the responsible persons become the insurers
of the trust.
3. The Duty of Loyalty
The most basic concept underlying the fiduciary relationship is
the duty of undivided loyalty, which requires the trustee to act in the
202
beneficiary's sole interest in matters involving the trust property.
The duty of loyalty prohibits self-dealing with and misappropriation of
the trust property, in addition to transactions in which the trustee has
a conflict of interest. 20 3 Apart from the common law right to
reasonable compensation, the trustee cannot benefit economically,
either directly or indirectly, from the trust property.2 04 This includes
an absolute bar on the borrowing of trust funds, which is treated no
20 5
differently than misappropriation.
The duty of loyalty applies equally to Code trusts. The
employer breaches the fiduciary duty of loyalty if its use of withheld
funds results in having insufficient funds to satisfy its tax obligation.

200. Thus, to the extent the "exclusive use principle" implies that the business cannot use
funds withheld from employment paychecks, it is wrong. Because no actual dollar is withheld
and no actual dollar is held in trust, there is no actual dollar whose use by the employer is
verboten.
201. From this perspective, the employer may subject the withheld funds to business risk,
and unlike the common law trustee, it can pocket the profits. It, however, cannot avoid
responsibility for the losses.
202. ROUNDS, supra note 168, at 202.
203. See Karen E. Boxx, Of Punctilios and Paybacks: The Duty of Loyalty Under the Uniform
Trust Code, 67 Mo. L. REV. 279, 281 (2002); Cooter & Freedman, supra note 5, at 1047.
204. ROUNDS, supra note 168, at 204.
205. See Charles Bryan Baron, Self-Dealing Trustees and the Exoneration Clause: Can
Trustees Ever Profit from TransactionsInvolving Trust Property, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 43, 45-46
(1998). Charles Rounds says it nicely: "Nothing good can come of a trustee's borrowing from the
trust estate no matter how competitive the interest rate may be and no matter how complete the
paper trail .... The thief when caught asserts it is only a loan." ROUNDS, supranote 168, at 206.
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In contrast to common law trusts, the mere use of the withheld funds
is not a misappropriation of the trust property. 206 Misappropriation
occurs only where the employer uses its available funds in such a way
that it is unable to pay the taxes when due. Misappropriation does
20 7
not and, indeed, cannot occur until a payment is due.
Under the common law "no further inquiry rule," once selfdealing is discovered, the court makes no further inquiry into the
reasonableness of the decision to use the trust property, refusing "to
208
deal with the question of abstract justice in the particular case."
Reasonable cause exceptions that excuse the misappropriation of trust
fund taxes are inconsistent with this rule-no reason, no matter how
great, justifies the use of the withheld funds by the employer. 20 9 In
sum, the special nature of the Code trust in no way affects the
application of the common law duty of loyalty to the Code trustee.
Once misappropriation is established, the employer must be held
210
liable.
4. Liability for Misappropriation
The legal rules surrounding the common law duty of loyalty
recognize that to act in the best interest of another is wholly
inconsistent with the tenet of economics that all persons act in their
own best interest. 2 11 The duty of loyalty for both common law and
Code trusts must therefore serve both a corrective and deterrent
function; creating an incentive structure that brings these two
competing interests together by making disloyalty so prejudicial to the
trustee that it is in his best interest not to breach the trust. 212

206. See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
207. This conclusion is true even if one considers the employer as "borrowing" the withheld
funds, with the intent to pay back the government. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
208. Baron, supra note 205, at 53-55.
209. "This [no further inquiry] rule sounds almost unreasonably harsh, but it is required
because of the demonstrated fallibility of humanity. There are no exceptions, although there are
limits." ROUNDS, supra note 168, at 205-06. The principle should be no different with respect to
Code trusts.
210. Every instance of an employer failing to pay the trust fund taxes on time will not
constitute misappropriation. See infra note 228. The "no further inquiry" rule applies only if
misappropriation causes the failure to remit the taxes.
211. Cooter & Freedman, supra note 5, at 1074.
212. Baron, supra note 205, at 52; Cooter & Freedman, supra note 5, at 1074. From this
perspective, therefore, the rule against misappropriation must serve not only a corrective
function, ensuring the government receives the full amount of the tax funds owed, but also a
deterrent function, ensuring the punishment is severe enough that employers will avoid using
the tax funds to pay their business creditors or employees.
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At common law, the traditional remedy for breach of loyalty
was disgorgement, which requires the trustee to make the beneficiary
whole for any losses and to give up all the profits obtained through the
misuse of the trust funds. 213 Disgorgement is an imperfect remedy if it
simply places the trustee in the position that he would have occupied
absent the misappropriation: "Just as a thief cannot be deterred
simply by requiring her to return the stolen goods whenever she is
caught, an agent cannot be deterred from appropriating a principal's
214
asset" by simply returning the ill-gotten gain.
Similarly, an employer in financial need will not be deterred
from using the withheld funds if it is simply required to pay the
amount of taxes due at a later date, with no penalty. It is necessary to
punish the trustee in order to create adequate incentives to comply
with the duty of loyalty. 21 5 Both common law disgorgement and the
Code must therefore deter misappropriations by making the expected
benefit less then the expected sanction. 21 6 The penalty provisions
provided for in the Code serve this purpose. The failure-to-pay
penalties punish the employer by making noncompliance with the tax
law more costly then compliance. The trust fund recovery penalty
punishes those responsible for noncompliance by holding them
personally liable. To the extent that noncompliance is excused through
reasonable cause exceptions, such as when the employer pays only its
essential creditors, the Code will fail to prevent misappropriation.
In sum, to the extent that the reasonable cause exceptions of
the penalty provisions allow for justifiable misappropriation, they are
entirely inconsistent with the duty of loyalty. First, under traditional
trust principles, the "no further inquiry" rule, misappropriation is
never justifiable. Second, the duty of loyalty must include a liability
provision that adequately deters misappropriation. Currently, some
courts apply the Code's penalty provisions in ways that allow
noncompliance and, thus, fail to deter misappropriation.
C. Policy Suggestions
A faithful application of duty of loyalty principles to the Code
trust has implications for the rules surrounding both the trust fund
recovery penalty and the failure-to-pay penalties. First, the majority
rule rejecting a reasonable cause exception to the definition of
213. Boxx, supranote 166, at 18.
214. See Cooter & Freedman, supra note 5, at 1053; supra note 14.
215. Cooter & Freedman, supra note 5, at 1069.
216. To be a successful deterrent, the expected sanction must equal or exceed the gain from
wrongdoing. Id. at 1052.
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willfulness is proper, though this does not mean that the Finley court's
insights should be ignored. Second, the minority rule rejecting
consideration of financial difficulties in determining reasonable cause
under the failure-to-pay penalties is proper. The essential creditor
and willing partner rules should be rejected.
1. The Trust Fund Recovery Penalty
The Finley rule excuses the responsible person if he made
reasonable efforts to protect the withheld funds but was frustrated by
circumstances outside of his control. 217 Such an inquiry will allow for
misappropriation, especially if the "outside the responsible person's
control" prong is read broadly. 2 18 Under the duty of loyalty, this rule
must be rejected to the extent it allows for misappropriation.
This does not mean that the central insight of Finley-that it is
unfair to hold a person liable if the company's assets have been seized
by a third party-should be rejected as well. In fact, this insight is
theoretically sound as applied to the responsibility element of the
trust fund recovery penalty. A narrower reading of this element alone
should limit the statute's reach to those truly responsible for the
misappropriation; they should be held liable for breach of their duty of
219
loyalty.
The fundamentals of the fiduciary relationship support a
narrow reading of the responsibility element. The duty of loyalty
applies only to persons with actual discretion over the trust
property. 22 0 Therefore, only those agents of the employer with
fiduciary discretion over the trust fund taxes are truly responsible for
nonpayment. 221 Focusing on those with the ultimate authority is the
best means by which to ensure that the target of the penalty truly had

217. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
218. It is unclear whether, to be "outside the responsible person's control," the employer's
assets have to be seized by a third party, as in Finley, or whether financial difficulties caused by
circumstances outside the taxpayer's control is sufficient (because of, for instance, a natural
disaster or the bankruptcy of its biggest customer). The use of the word "circumstances" suggests
the latter reading.
219. Bedikan, supra note 68, at 269-70.
220. See supra notes 181-184 and accompanying text.
221. When the employer is a corporation, it acts only through its agents; thus, the
corporation itself does not misappropriate, its agents do. See SHAFIROFF, supra note 2, at 9-5. In
other business forms, there is no need for the responsible person statute because the IRS can rely
on state law. For example, a general partner is fully liable for the partnership employment taxes
under the general fiduciary duty of partners. See, e.g, Remington v. United States, 210 F.3d 281,
283-84 (5th Cir. 2000). Also, sole proprietors are personally responsible for all business debts
under state law, including withheld taxes, without regard to section 6672. Schmehl & Fox, supra
note 25, at A-10.
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fiduciary discretion. 222 Of course, if individual discretion is removed,
such as when a superior orders an employee not to pay the taxes or
the employer's assets are seized by a third party, responsibility is
removed as well. 223 Those with actual discretion have a duty to ensure

the payment of the taxes, such that intentional borrowing of the
withheld funds for the employer's behalf exposes the borrowers to
personal liability. 224 With a narrower reading of responsibility, the
onerous reach of the statute is substantially lessened.
A further problem identified by Finley is the widespread use of
as-a-matter-of-law factual paradigms, which the court believes
imposes virtual strict liability for willfulness. 2 25 The Finley court's
concern for the proper role of the jury can be heeded in a more limited
way than the adoption of a reasonable cause exception. One solution
is to adopt a rule that a finding of recklessness without actual
knowledge requires a jury to determine whether the lack of knowledge
226
was reckless, negligent, or even reasonable.
At the same time, as-a-matter-of-law holdings remain
appropriate
in cases involving actual knowledge
of the
misappropriation. 227 If the responsible person is actually aware of the
nonpayment, the action or inaction of the person is, by definition,
willful. Limiting as-a-matter-of-law holdings to cases in which the
responsible person had actual knowledge will both preserve the role of
the jury and ensure that liability is not imposed without personal
fault.
2. The Failure-To-Pay Penalties
Ultimately, the Brewery court's per se rule is most consistent
with the employer's duty of loyalty implicit in the Code trust. First, it
categorically rejects justifiable misappropriation, which is consistent
with the common law "no further inquiry" rule. Second, it preserves
the reasonable cause exception for circumstances that do not involve

222. But see supra note 78 (noting that courts generally reject the ultimate authority test).
223. See supra notes 83-84, 127 and accompanying text.
224. If the employer is a corporation, the responsible persons are agents of the trustee, and
they may be held liable if they knowingly participated in a breach of trust. ROUNDS, supra note
168, at 180-81.
225. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
226. Thus, the jury would have to determine if the responsible person acted recklessly in
relying on a certain person to pay the taxes or if the failure to make inquiry into the payment of
the taxes during times of financial difficulties was in fact reckless. See supra notes 99, 101.
227. Thus, the jury does not have a role in the deliberate choice paradigms or when
recklessness is based on the failure to correct mismanagement after notice of nonpayment. See
supra notes 91-94, 100.
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disloyalty, yet it does not eliminate the reasonable cause exception for
trust fund taxes. 228 The language of the Regulations clearly intends
the scope of reasonable cause for trust fund taxes to be narrower than
for direct taxes. 229 Finally, it is an effective deterrent against
misappropriation because it punishes the employer rather than simply
requiring that the government be made whole.
Adoption of the per se rule recognizes the special nature of
withheld taxes as being held in trust. It does not affect the
circumstances that constitute reasonable cause for direct taxes, in
which financial difficulties remain a legitimate factor. 230 It is no
greater burden on the courts to require them to clearly differentiate
231
between the two in applying the exception.
The duty of loyalty bars misappropriation for any reason.232
Thus, the essential creditor rule must be rejected since it allows
misappropriation in order to pay essential creditors and employees. 233
In addition, the "willing partner" rule must be rejected because
misappropriation is never justified, even if the beneficiary is somehow
the cause of the trustee's financial difficulties. 234
V. CONCLUSION

Misappropriation of trust fund taxes by an employer should be
treated as the equivalent of misappropriation of trust property by a
common law trustee. Both involve the violation of the most basic trust
principle, the duty of loyalty, and both must be punished without
exception. In describing this requirement, Charles Rounds aptly
stated that,
The no further inquiry rule

should continue to apply to unauthorized trustee

borrowings, and the courts should resist the temptation to recognize "fairness" and

228. See Sarah S. Brieden, Case Note, The Ninth Circuit Holds that an Employer's Financial
Difficulties Can Constitute Reasonable Cause for Failure to Pay Employment Taxes-Van Camp
& Bennison, P.S. v. United States, 56 SMU L. Rev. 749, 752-53 (2003). Reasonable cause will
excuse late payment of trust fund taxes in the following circumstances, among others: (1) death
or serious injury of agent having sole authority to pay; (2) unavoidable absence of the agent; (3)
destruction by casualty of the employer's records; (4) employer unable to determine amount of
payment because he could not access his records because of circumstances beyond its control. See
IRS, supra note 14, § 1.2.1.3.3; cf. In re Frederick Savage, Inc., 179 B.R. 342, 348 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1995) ("If every taxpayer's cash flow problems were sufficient to justify delay in payment of
taxes, such an exception would swallow the rule.")
229. See supranote 138 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 137, 140 and accompanying text.
231. See Brieden, supra note 228, at 753-54.
232. See supra notes 208-209 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 157-158 and accompanying text
234. See supra notes 160-161 and accompanying text.
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"benign intentions" as legitimate defenses to such activity. To do otherwise is to tempt
the honest and afford avenues of escape to the dishonest. The law should be absolutely
unambiguous
in this regard and ignorance of it should never be a judicially recognized
235
excuse.

To the extent that they excuse misappropriation, the
reasonable cause exceptions recognized by some courts are all
examples of the "fairness" defense that Rounds cautions courts to
avoid. The law should be absolutely unambiguous in prohibiting the
misappropriation of trust property, even if the beneficiary is the IRS
and the trust property is taxes. This rule simply holds employers and
their agents accountable for the choices that they make.
P. Prestin Weidner*

235. ROUNDS, supra note 168, at 208.
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